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Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II

 
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Manage episode 398372939 series 3548889
İçerik Independence Institute tarafından sağlanmıştır. Bölümler, grafikler ve podcast açıklamaları dahil tüm podcast içeriği doğrudan Independence Institute veya podcast platform ortağı tarafından yüklenir ve sağlanır. Birinin telif hakkıyla korunan çalışmanızı izniniz olmadan kullandığını düşünüyorsanız burada https://tr.player.fm/legal özetlenen süreci takip edebilirsiniz.

For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here.

This essay first appeared in the Jan. 9, 2024 Epoch Times.

Part I of this series showed that under the Constitution, an “invasion” triggers powers and obligations for both federal and state governments. It also showed that mass unauthorized immigration at the Southern border meets the constitutional definition of an “invasion.”

This Part II explains federal and state responsibility in the face of invasion. Further, this Part introduces the topic of trans-national criminal gangs, and how states may respond to them.

All the installments in this series are based on a research article I co-wrote with legal scholar Andrew T. Hyman (pdf).

Some Basic Principles

War, borders, and foreign affairs are subjects of international law. The American Founders called international law the “law of nations.” For their background in the law of nations, the Founders relied on their own experience and on a handful of leading authors: the Dutch writer Hugo Grotius, the Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel, and others (pdf). Reading those authors today sheds light on the Constitution’s meaning and organization.

Founding-era “law of nations” books distinguished between offensive wars and defensive wars. A sovereign fought a just offensive war to seek compensation for injury or to deter an enemy from inflicting injury. (Wars for mere conquest were considered “unjust.”) A sovereign launching a just offensive war generally preceded it with a formal announcement called a declaration of war.

Sovereigns fought defensive wars to prevent injury. Examples were military responses to invasion and insurrection. Usually a sovereign engaged in a defensive war was not the first to strike. But if an invasion was imminent, a sovereign could launch a pre-emptive attack, and it still was considered defensive.

A sovereign commencing defensive military operations was not required to issue a declaration of war, although it might do so.

Federal War Powers

The division between offensive and defensive warfare is baked into our Constitution. The division helps explain which military powers the Constitution granted the federal government and which military powers the states retained.

Under the Constitution, only the federal government may wage offensive war. Congress, therefore, may “declare War” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11).

The Constitution also grants the federal government power to wage defensive war. Article II, Section 3 directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This was the section that gave Abraham Lincoln authority to commence military operations against the seceding Southern states.

Article IV, Section 4 says that “The United States shall . . . protect each [state] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” This language means (1) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage defensive war against invasion (a duty the Biden administration is disregarding), and (2) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage war or undertake a police action against domestic violence, if an affected state demands that it do so.

Several other constitutional provisions give the federal government authority to create a war machine: raising armies, maintaining a navy, calling forth state militias, and so forth. In all cases, the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1).

State War Powers

The Constitution did not transfer all sovereignty to the federal government. Some sovereignty—including some sovereign war powers—remained in the states. During the constitutional debates of 1787-1790, the Constitution’s advocates repeatedly explained this. State war power did not derive from the Constitution. It was part of the reservoir of sovereign authority retained by the states (“reserved”) after the document was ratified.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 limited these reserved state war powers, but also recognized them:

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

Let’s flip that language to an affirmative form:

“Any state may keep troops and ships of war in time of war, . . . and engage in war . . . if actually invaded or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

In other words, states may wage defensive, but not offensive, war. Unlike the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the Constitution imposed no limit on the armies or navies a state may raise during a time of war. (The states are not limited to their militias.) Unlike the Articles, the Constitution laid down no requirement that the war be congressionally-declared and no restriction on the nature of the invasion. The only requirements imposed by the Constitution are that there be an actual invasion or an “imminent Danger” of one.

It is common to say that the Constitution reduced state power from what it had been under the Articles of Confederation. But this was not true in the area of warmaking.

Another point about the states’ reserved powers: The Constitution did not abolish state capacity to enforce the law against criminals. Which brings us to the next topic.

“Enemies of the Human Race”

During the 18th century, civilized nations often were disturbed by criminal gangs that recognized no sovereigns. Legal writers called these gangs, hostes humani generis— a Latin phrase meaning “enemies of the human race.”

Enemies of the human race might operate on the sea, prey on shipping, and attack port towns. If so, they were called “pirates.” But enemies of the human race also included land-based gangs of thieves, deserters, poisoners, assassins, incendiaries, and (as the legal commentator William Blackstone characterized them) “unauthorized voluntiers [sic] in violence.”

The Constitution left the states with power to conduct war against invasions launched by enemies of the human race. It also left the states with police power to respond to their criminal acts.

The attitudes of the founding generation against these malefactors was remorseless. As Emer de Vattel, the Founders’ favorite international law authority, wrote:

“[I]f the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories; we ought to except from this rule, the villains, who by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized . . . .”

Can you think of some “enemies of the human race” operating along our Southern border today?

The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II first appeared on Independence Institute.

The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II appeared first on Independence Institute.

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Manage episode 398372939 series 3548889
İçerik Independence Institute tarafından sağlanmıştır. Bölümler, grafikler ve podcast açıklamaları dahil tüm podcast içeriği doğrudan Independence Institute veya podcast platform ortağı tarafından yüklenir ve sağlanır. Birinin telif hakkıyla korunan çalışmanızı izniniz olmadan kullandığını düşünüyorsanız burada https://tr.player.fm/legal özetlenen süreci takip edebilirsiniz.

For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here.

This essay first appeared in the Jan. 9, 2024 Epoch Times.

Part I of this series showed that under the Constitution, an “invasion” triggers powers and obligations for both federal and state governments. It also showed that mass unauthorized immigration at the Southern border meets the constitutional definition of an “invasion.”

This Part II explains federal and state responsibility in the face of invasion. Further, this Part introduces the topic of trans-national criminal gangs, and how states may respond to them.

All the installments in this series are based on a research article I co-wrote with legal scholar Andrew T. Hyman (pdf).

Some Basic Principles

War, borders, and foreign affairs are subjects of international law. The American Founders called international law the “law of nations.” For their background in the law of nations, the Founders relied on their own experience and on a handful of leading authors: the Dutch writer Hugo Grotius, the Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel, and others (pdf). Reading those authors today sheds light on the Constitution’s meaning and organization.

Founding-era “law of nations” books distinguished between offensive wars and defensive wars. A sovereign fought a just offensive war to seek compensation for injury or to deter an enemy from inflicting injury. (Wars for mere conquest were considered “unjust.”) A sovereign launching a just offensive war generally preceded it with a formal announcement called a declaration of war.

Sovereigns fought defensive wars to prevent injury. Examples were military responses to invasion and insurrection. Usually a sovereign engaged in a defensive war was not the first to strike. But if an invasion was imminent, a sovereign could launch a pre-emptive attack, and it still was considered defensive.

A sovereign commencing defensive military operations was not required to issue a declaration of war, although it might do so.

Federal War Powers

The division between offensive and defensive warfare is baked into our Constitution. The division helps explain which military powers the Constitution granted the federal government and which military powers the states retained.

Under the Constitution, only the federal government may wage offensive war. Congress, therefore, may “declare War” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11).

The Constitution also grants the federal government power to wage defensive war. Article II, Section 3 directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This was the section that gave Abraham Lincoln authority to commence military operations against the seceding Southern states.

Article IV, Section 4 says that “The United States shall . . . protect each [state] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” This language means (1) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage defensive war against invasion (a duty the Biden administration is disregarding), and (2) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage war or undertake a police action against domestic violence, if an affected state demands that it do so.

Several other constitutional provisions give the federal government authority to create a war machine: raising armies, maintaining a navy, calling forth state militias, and so forth. In all cases, the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1).

State War Powers

The Constitution did not transfer all sovereignty to the federal government. Some sovereignty—including some sovereign war powers—remained in the states. During the constitutional debates of 1787-1790, the Constitution’s advocates repeatedly explained this. State war power did not derive from the Constitution. It was part of the reservoir of sovereign authority retained by the states (“reserved”) after the document was ratified.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 limited these reserved state war powers, but also recognized them:

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

Let’s flip that language to an affirmative form:

“Any state may keep troops and ships of war in time of war, . . . and engage in war . . . if actually invaded or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

In other words, states may wage defensive, but not offensive, war. Unlike the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the Constitution imposed no limit on the armies or navies a state may raise during a time of war. (The states are not limited to their militias.) Unlike the Articles, the Constitution laid down no requirement that the war be congressionally-declared and no restriction on the nature of the invasion. The only requirements imposed by the Constitution are that there be an actual invasion or an “imminent Danger” of one.

It is common to say that the Constitution reduced state power from what it had been under the Articles of Confederation. But this was not true in the area of warmaking.

Another point about the states’ reserved powers: The Constitution did not abolish state capacity to enforce the law against criminals. Which brings us to the next topic.

“Enemies of the Human Race”

During the 18th century, civilized nations often were disturbed by criminal gangs that recognized no sovereigns. Legal writers called these gangs, hostes humani generis— a Latin phrase meaning “enemies of the human race.”

Enemies of the human race might operate on the sea, prey on shipping, and attack port towns. If so, they were called “pirates.” But enemies of the human race also included land-based gangs of thieves, deserters, poisoners, assassins, incendiaries, and (as the legal commentator William Blackstone characterized them) “unauthorized voluntiers [sic] in violence.”

The Constitution left the states with power to conduct war against invasions launched by enemies of the human race. It also left the states with police power to respond to their criminal acts.

The attitudes of the founding generation against these malefactors was remorseless. As Emer de Vattel, the Founders’ favorite international law authority, wrote:

“[I]f the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories; we ought to except from this rule, the villains, who by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized . . . .”

Can you think of some “enemies of the human race” operating along our Southern border today?

The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II first appeared on Independence Institute.

The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II appeared first on Independence Institute.

  continue reading

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John Marshall is considered to be America’s greatest Chief Justice. However, he is often misrepresented—both by fans and opponents—as an early model for big-government, liberal judicial activism. Learn the facts from a leading constitutional scholar in this four-part audio series. Part I: Marshall’s early life and his contributions to the ratification of the Constitution Part II: Marshall’s role in the infamous “XYZ Affair” and his tenure in Congress and as Secretary of State Part III: The widely-misunderstood cases of Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland Part IV: The cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, Worcester v. Georgia, how he interpreted the Constitution, and later life . The post Learn About Chief Justice John Marshall from Rob Natelson’s New Audio Series first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Learn About Chief Justice John Marshall from Rob Natelson’s New Audio Series appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
Just click on the title you want to hear! New: The entire series: How the States May Respond to Illegal Immigration Part I : Why the Situation at the Southern Border is an “Invasion” as the Constitution Uses the Word Part II : State War Powers Part III : What the State May Do When Waging Defensive War Part IV : Federal Preemption and Interference Part V : Natural Born and Birthright Citizenship Posts on current Supreme Court Cases: The Highly Political and Misunderstood Case of Moore v. Harpe r Your Guide to This Year’s Constitutional Cases from SCOTUS, Part I Your Guide to This Year’s Constitutional Cases from SCOTUS, Part II The “Christian Web Designer Case” Could Have Been Much Easier Tyler v. Hennepin County: Why This Seemingly Innocent Decision is Disquieting Arizona v. Navajo Nation: Scotus Zags Back The Supreme Court’s Confused Decision in Haaland v. Brackeen Justice Thomas’s Latest Dissent: The Constitution and Federal Spending SCOTUS Curbs EPA: The Sackett Case The Supreme Court’s New Decision on “Taking Property” The Supreme Court Might Curb the “Deep State” By Overruling the Chevron case Other Posts: Why Even Constitutional Conventions are Limited Why It May be Impossible to Disqualify Trump from the Presidency What Trump Could—and Couldn’t—Do Under the Insurrection Act The Colorado Supreme Court’s Decision Disqualifying President Trump When a Court Vetoes the People: It Happened in Montana Christian Support for American Jews Began at the Founding What Does the Constitution Mean by “Natural Born Citizen?” Why I Still Doubt the 2020 Election John F. Kennedy, RIP: Part II, with a Parting Parallel re: Joe Biden Heritage Foundation Paper Supports a Convention of States What’s Wrong with the Universities, and How to Fix It: Part 1 What’s Wrong with the Universities, and How to Fix It: Part 2 What’s Wrong with the Universities, and How to Fix It: Part 3 What’s Wrong with the Universities and How to Fix It: Part 4 The Jenna Ellis Plea Deal: The Standard the Prosecutors Imposed on Her was Impossible to Meet Federal Power Outside the Constitution? Understanding the Constitution: The Speaker of the House Some Reasons Why Lawsuits to Disqualify Trump Will Fail Constitution’s Impeachment Rules Require Biden Inquiry to be Narrowly Focused Mike Pence, “Slate,” and the Carefree World of the Leftist Is Biden the Worst President Ever? A Historical Assessment Lakewood Taxpayers Foot the Bill for “Progressive” Propaganda Another Case of Government Failure: Lefty Lakewood Ignores Noise Laws The DC Circuit’s Convoluted Opinion on the “Equal Rights Amendment” More Evidence from the Founding: The Vice-President Could Not Delay the 2020 Presidential Vote Count The Truth the Media Haven’t Told You About the Montana Legislature’s Disciplining of a “Transgender” Activist. Why Biden Can’t Use the 14th Amendment to Raise the Debt Ceiling Rob Natelson’s now-famous “Defending the Constitution” series (10 Parts): Part 1: A Guide to “Defending the Constitution” Part 2: Limits on Federal Authority Part 3: The Constitution is not “Vague” Part 4: The Second Amendment is Not Outdated—We Need It More than Ever Part 5: Do We Have a “Living Constitution?” Part 6: The Framers Did Not Violate Their Trust Part 7: Why State Equality in the Senate? Part 8: Why the Founders Couldn’t Abolish Slavery Part 9: Reasons for the “Three-Fifths” Compromise Part 10: The Constitution and Gender Equality Listen to “How the Supreme Court Re-Wrote the Constitution, 1937-1944:” Learn How the “New Deal” Justices Destroyed the Constitution’s Protections for Liberty (7 Parts) Click on the title of the part you want to hear: Part 1: A Government Small and Frugal Part 2: The Stage is Set Part 3: The Court on the Brink Part 4: A Packed Court—and a Federal Land Grab Part 5: Killing Economic Freedom Part 6: Crushing Civil Liberties Part 7: Concentration Camps—and the End The post Listen! Constitution Posts in Audio Format, read by Rob Natelson first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Listen! Constitution Posts in Audio Format, read by Rob Natelson appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here . This essay was first published in the Jan. 13, 2024 Epoch Times. Part I , Part II , Part III , and Part IV of this series on how states may respond to illegal immigration summarized war powers retained by the states. Those installments explained how states can use those powers to check illegal entry at the Southern border. This series is based on an academic study researched and written with Massachusetts legal scholar Andrew T. Hyman, and scheduled for publication in the British Journal of American Legal Studies ( pdf ). This fifth and final essay recounts what we discovered about (1) the Constitution’s words “natural born Citizen” and (2) the claim that U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants are “birthright citizens.” “Allegiance” To determine the scope of state war powers, we had to explore a difficult legal term called “allegiance.” Most Americans encounter that word only when pledging the flag. However, “allegiance” is chock-full of legal meaning, and deeply rooted in Anglo-American and international law. Under a monarchy, the king and his subjects have reciprocal obligations. The king must defend and the subject must obey. The subject’s obligation is called “allegiance.” Before America declared Independence in 1776, the colonists were subjects of the British Crown and owed allegiance to the king. A colonist might be a subject because he or she was born within the British Empire. Or the colonist might have been foreign-born, but naturalized as a subject. Even non-naturalized foreigners could be British subjects. If a foreigner was living or visiting legally in the British Empire (including the North American colonies), he owed “local allegiance” to the Crown for the duration of his stay. This meant the foreigner had a duty to obey local law while within the Empire, even if his primary allegiance was to his homeland. A foreigner from a friendly country legally staying in the British Empire and subject to local allegiance was called an “alien friend.” But if you entered the Empire illegally, or your nation was at war with Great Britain, then you were an “alien enemy.” Unless you received special permission to stay, you were not in allegiance to the British Crown. You could forfeit your property and be forced to leave the country. In 1776, the original 14 states (the 13 new “united States” plus Vermont) became independent republics. When the Constitution was ratified, it created a federal republic. But all the states adopted the Anglo-American legal system, including the concept of allegiance. In a monarchy, every subject owes allegiance and everyone who owes allegiance is a subject. However, republics do not have subjects. They have citizens. Whether you are a citizen of a republic depends on the laws of the republic. Every citizen owes allegiance to his republic, but not everyone in allegiance is a citizen. Here is an example of the difference: Suppose a Japanese wife and husband lawfully visit England as tourists. They are “alien friends” and in local allegiance to the British Crown. Thus, they are temporary British subjects. Now suppose the couple decides to tour the U.S. If admitted legally, they are now our alien friends, and they owe local allegiance. But they are not citizens. So there are is a difference between how “subject” and “citizen” connect with “allegiance.” Still, allegiance remains very important, and it affects the meaning of several portions of the Constitution. Two examples are Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, which requires the President to be a “natural born Citizen,” and the part of Section 1 of the 14 th amendment called the Citizenship Clause. Natural Born Citizen I discussed the concept of natural born citizen in an Epoch Times essay last year. I explained that being a natural born citizen requires more than merely being a citizen. The additional requirements depend largely on the allegiance of one’s father. You may have your own ideas of what “natural born citizen” should mean. But that essay summarized the standards prescribed by the Constitution. One of the rules is that a person born in U.S. territory whose father is rightfully in this country is natural born. If our Japanese tourist couple have a baby here, the child is a natural born American. For the other rules, see last year’s essay . Birthright Citizen Birthright citizenship is the idea that children born in the U.S. of foreign parents are natural born American citizens. The child born in America to the Japanese tourist couple is a birthright citizen. But our Japanese tourist couple was in the country legally . Does birthright citizenship apply to the children of foreigners in the country illegally? Many people assume the answer is “yes.” That’s why some foreign women sneak across the border while pregnant to give birth on U.S. territory. They think their child will automatically be an American citizen. Agents of the U.S. government often operate on the same assumption. I recently did a search with the “Brave” internet browser, and my search produced the flat statement that the assumption is true. But is it really true? The Citizenship Clause of the 14 th amendment reads as follows: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” This doesn’t say merely “born . . . in the United States.” It adds “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. What does “subject to the jurisdiction” mean? In other parts of the Constitution, the word “jurisdiction” means “within territorial boundaries.” But that can’t be the meaning here, because otherwise the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of” would be redundant. The history of the 14 th amendment tells us what “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States means. It means that for a child to have birthright citizenship, his parents must be in allegiance to the United States. His parents cannot be invaders. They cannot be foreign diplomats. And in 1868, when the 14 th amendment was adopted, the child’s parents couldn’t be tribal Indians. (That was changed in 1924 by the federal Indian Citizenship Act.) The Supreme Court has confirmed what history tells us. In 1884, the court stated that “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” means “in allegiance to the U.S.” ( pdf ). In 1898, it ruled that children born of foreigners lawfully in this country (and therefore in local allegiance) are American citizens ( pdf ). What About the Children of Illegal Immigrants? Whether a child born in the U.S. of illegal immigrants is an American citizen hinges on whether the child’s parents are then in allegiance to the United States. If the father is not in allegiance, then the child is not an American citizen. Your gut might tell you that illegal immigrants are invaders who have disregarded American law, so they can’t be in allegiance to the United States. But the answer is not that simple. Although much of what is going on at the Southern border does qualify as “invasion,” many people enter the country in other ways and not as invaders. (They may overstay a visa, for example.) In most cases, after that single violation, they become law-abiding. You can argue that an illegal immigrant who becomes otherwise law-abiding is in local allegiance. In 2015, I wrote an essay saying that whether the U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants are American citizens is a difficult question. The Supreme Court has never addressed it, and I confessed I did not know the answer. Although the Supreme Court still has not ruled on the question, our research on state war powers and on allegiance clearly points to an answer: A person entering a country without permission is technically an “alien enemy,” and not in allegiance to the United States. Thus, a woman who enters this country illegally to bear a child does not produce an American citizen. She produces another illegal alien. The post How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration, Part V: About Birthright Citizenship first appeared on Independence Institute . The post How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration, Part V: About Birthright Citizenship appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here. This essay was first published in the Jan. 12, 2024 Epoch Times. Part I of this series showed that the unauthorized mass migration into states at the Southern border qualifies as an “invasion” as the Constitution uses the term. That Part also pointed to a constitutional canard —the false claim that federal power over war, immigration, and foreign commerce is “exclusive,” and that the states have no authority over those subjects whatsoever. But as Part II and Part III demonstrated, the Constitution explicitly recognizes state authority to wage defensive war when invaded. This Part IV examines a particularly thorny problem: To what extent may the federal government interfere when states exercise their defensive war powers? The issue comes up this way: First, a state makes a decision traditionally associated with defensive war. It may erect barriers, restrict foreign goods, control immigration, or hold prisoners. Then the federal government or private parties sue the state, claiming these subjects are “preempted” by federal law, and the state may do nothing. Federal preemption arguments have had more success than the Constitution justifies. The Idea of Federal Preemption The Constitution grants the federal government certain enumerated (listed) powers. When the federal government constitutionally exercises one of these powers, its decision is “the supreme Law of the Land.” In such a case, federal law “preempts” (overrides) state law. On the other hand, if the federal government acts outside its enumerated powers, the action has no legal effect, and state law remains controlling. Consider the efforts of Texas authorities to place barriers against migrants trying to cross the Rio Grande River. As noted in Part III, barrier-placement is perfectly consistent with defensive war. On the other hand, control of navigable rivers always has been recognized as a federal prerogative under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). Because federal regulations of foreign and interstate commerce trump state regulations, two courts have upheld federal objections to Texas putting barriers in the river. Presumably, Texas could erect them away from the riverbank. A state conducting a defensive war also may wish to restrict foreign commerce (through trade restrictions) and limit migration into the state. The Constitution left the states with that authority. For one thing, the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention explicitly decided that the states should retain the power to impose trade restrictions. For another, the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 1) explicitly recognizes state authority over both voluntary migration and foreign commerce (in this case, referencing a particularly despicable form of foreign commerce—the slave trade). If Congress acts to regulate foreign commerce or immigration (Article I, Section 8, Clause 10) ( pdf ), congressional law preempts inconsistent state measures. On the other hand, if Congress has not acted—or if a state law regulating foreign commerce or immigration is broadly consistent with federal policy—the state law should be valid. Yet as shown in Part I, courts sometimes void state laws on immigration as “preempted”—even when those state laws are broadly consistent with federal policy. In my view, this is a gross over-extension of the federal preemption doctrine. It seems to be based on the false notion that states have no authority over immigration at all and that federal power is “exclusive.” When cases like these come before the federal courts, state lawyers must vigorously demonstrate that the “exclusivity” claim is flatly wrong. The evidence—including the Constitution’s actual wording—is quite clear on this point: States may regulate immigration in ways broadly consistent with federal law. They also may regulate immigration when the federal government has not. Once the courts see that the exclusivity claim is wrong, they should allow states more latitude. Where States Should Be Supreme Some defensive state war powers should not be subject to federal preemption at all. During the debates over the Constitution, the document’s advocates strongly emphasized that states would have the right to defend themselves. For example, they affirmed that states would, except in specified circumstances, control their own armed forces. They also represented that states could suspend the writ of habeas corpus, thereby enabling them to hold prisoners of war without trial. A modern argument against this is the following: The Constitution not only gives the federal government powers listed in the document, but also vast “necessary and proper” (incidental) powers. The federal government can use these to override state efforts at self-defense. This argument is a threat because, as I explained in my Epoch Times series “ How the Supreme Court Rewrote the Constitution ,” during the 20 th century the Supreme Court stretched the central government’s incidental powers beyond recognition. As a result, the feds can claim they aren’t limited to blocking Texas from erecting barriers in a navigable river. They may assert that they also can prevent state barriers on dry land because of federal incidental power over dry land. Fortunately, the Supreme Court is aware of the distortions caused by its expansion of federal powers, and sometimes tries to remedy it. Here’s an approach state lawyers might try: In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Printz v. United States ( pdf ). In that case, the court considered the federal “Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,” which ordered local sheriffs (who legally are state officials) to perform background checks on people seeking to purchase firearms. The federal government argued that the Brady Act was within the Supreme Court’s greatly expanded federal Commerce Power because it was “necessary and proper” to regulating commerce. Yet the court ruled that even if this part of the Brady Act was “necessary” (incidental), it was not “proper.” The court said a federal law could not be “proper” if it “violate[d] the principle of state sovereignty” by dictating to a state the duties of its own officials. A state’s power of self-defense is even more central to its sovereignty than full control over its own officials. That power of self-defense should not be subject to the whim of federal officials. Otherwise, those officials could (like the Biden administration) refuse to protect a disfavored state from invasion and then prohibit the state from defending itself as well. Not even the modern Supreme Court would permit that. The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part IV first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part IV appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here. This essay first appeared in the Jan. 10, 2024 Epoch Times. Part I and Part II in this series explained that: The Constitution grants the federal government the exclusive power to wage offensive war; but the states as well as the federal government may wage defensive war; the states may wage defensive war against insurrectionists and against actual or threatened invasions—including invasions by those international criminal gangs the Founders called “enemies of the human race;” and the historical record shows that the mass illegal immigration at the Southern border is an “Invasion” as the Constitution uses that word. A Not-So-Hypothetical Situation As part of our research into state war powers, my co-author, Andrew T. Hyman, and I examined the scope of “defensive war” as the Founders understood it. In other words, we examined what an American state can, and can’t do, when fighting a defensive war. To make it easier to understand what we learned, let’s use the following not-so-hypothetical illustration: “Texas state authorities determine that their state is being invaded from Mexico. They further find that the invasion is being promoted by organizations determined to flood the U.S. with undocumented migrants and by international criminal gangs trafficking in drugs and people. “Texas authorities also determine that the Mexican government cannot prevent the invasion, because 30 to 35 percent of Mexican territory is “ungoverned space,” where criminal cartels operate freely ( pdf ).” Now, in this situation, the Constitution forbids Texas from waging offensive war. Only the federal government may do that. Thus, Texas may not attack Mexico purely for revenge, deterrence, or compensation. Nor may Texas drop bombs on Mexican cities or scour the seas to sink Mexican ships. In addition, the Constitution specifically rules out state use of “letters of marque and reprisal” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1). These are documents commissioning private ships to ply the waters in search of enemy craft and, finding them, capture them or send them to the bottom. Even if the Constitution did not prevent states from using letters of marque and reprisal, international law would: They were effectively abolished by an international agreement signed in 1856. But that doesn’t mean Texas must sit back and “let the feds handle it” (or mishandle it). On the contrary, an invasion of a state empowers—and obligates—that state’s government to do what is legal and reasonably necessary to stop the invasion. Under the Constitution, the fact of invasion empowers the state to raise an army, either through volunteers or by conscription, for the purpose of repelling the attack. The Constitution does not require this army to be part of the formal militia. A state may take defensive measures associated with war but falling short of full-blown hostilities. Some of these defensive measures are discussed in the next installment. One example is that the state may build protective barriers. However, as also discussed in the next installment, some of these measures may conflict with federal law or policy. Moreover, the state invaded has the right to seek out and kill the invaders and those responsible for the invasion. As noted by Emer de Vattel, the Founders’ favorite international law scholar: “The enemy attacking me unjustly, gives me an undoubted right of repelling his violences [ sic ]; and he who opposes me in arms, when I demand only my right, becomes himself the real aggressor by his unjust resistance . . . For if the effects of this force proceed so far as to take away his life, he owes the misfortune to himself; for if by sparing him I should submit to the injury, the good would soon become the prey of the wicked. Hence the right of killing enemies in a just war is derived; when their resistance cannot be suppressed, when they are not to be reduced by milder methods, there is a right of taking away their life . . . But the very manner by which the right of killing enemies is proved, points out also the limits of this right. On an enemy’s submitting and delivering up his arms, we cannot with justice take away his life.” In addition to killing enemies who refuse to surrender their arms, a state under invasion may seek out hostile forces in their territory or in the state’s own territory. This means that if Mexico does not stem the invasion, Texas may make forays across the border to attack those masterminding the assault. Besides killing invaders (if necessary), Texas may capture them, seize their property, and remove them to, and hold them in, any safe location. The state also may punish—even execute—those guilty of war crimes. Finally, if consistent with state law, Texas may prosecute for treason any of its own citizens caught assisting the enemy. (Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 22). If those tactics sound extreme, they are. War—even defensive war—is extreme. Two “Yes, buts. . .” I hasten to qualify the foregoing in two ways. First, merely because the Constitution permits a course of action does not mean that an invaded state should pursue it. Most of the illegal migrants are civilians seeking a better life. They should be deported, not mistreated. States should limit the use of deadly force to the invasion’s organizers and, if necessary, to any captives who refuse to comply with reasonable orders, including orders of removal. Second: There are various state actions traditionally associated with war that the federal government may not override. But there are other actions that are subject to federal “preemption.” The next installment in this series will address this difficult issue. The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part III first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part III appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here . This essay first appeared in the Jan. 9, 2024 Epoch Times. Part I of this series showed that under the Constitution, an “invasion” triggers powers and obligations for both federal and state governments. It also showed that mass unauthorized immigration at the Southern border meets the constitutional definition of an “invasion.” This Part II explains federal and state responsibility in the face of invasion. Further, this Part introduces the topic of trans-national criminal gangs, and how states may respond to them. All the installments in this series are based on a research article I co-wrote with legal scholar Andrew T. Hyman ( pdf) . Some Basic Principles War, borders, and foreign affairs are subjects of international law. The American Founders called international law the “law of nations.” For their background in the law of nations, the Founders relied on their own experience and on a handful of leading authors: the Dutch writer Hugo Grotius, the Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel, and others ( pdf ). Reading those authors today sheds light on the Constitution’s meaning and organization. Founding-era “law of nations” books distinguished between offensive wars and defensive wars . A sovereign fought a just offensive war to seek compensation for injury or to deter an enemy from inflicting injury. (Wars for mere conquest were considered “unjust.”) A sovereign launching a just offensive war generally preceded it with a formal announcement called a declaration of war . Sovereigns fought defensive wars to prevent injury. Examples were military responses to invasion and insurrection. Usually a sovereign engaged in a defensive war was not the first to strike. But if an invasion was imminent, a sovereign could launch a pre-emptive attack, and it still was considered defensive. A sovereign commencing defensive military operations was not required to issue a declaration of war, although it might do so. Federal War Powers The division between offensive and defensive warfare is baked into our Constitution. The division helps explain which military powers the Constitution granted the federal government and which military powers the states retained. Under the Constitution, only the federal government may wage offensive war. Congress, therefore, may “declare War” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11). The Constitution also grants the federal government power to wage defensive war. Article II, Section 3 directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This was the section that gave Abraham Lincoln authority to commence military operations against the seceding Southern states. Article IV, Section 4 says that “The United States shall . . . protect each [state] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” This language means (1) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage defensive war against invasion (a duty the Biden administration is disregarding), and (2) the federal government is empowered—and required—to wage war or undertake a police action against domestic violence, if an affected state demands that it do so. Several other constitutional provisions give the federal government authority to create a war machine: raising armies, maintaining a navy, calling forth state militias, and so forth. In all cases, the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). State War Powers The Constitution did not transfer all sovereignty to the federal government. Some sovereignty—including some sovereign war powers—remained in the states. During the constitutional debates of 1787-1790, the Constitution’s advocates repeatedly explained this. State war power did not derive from the Constitution. It was part of the reservoir of sovereign authority retained by the states (“reserved”) after the document was ratified. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 limited these reserved state war powers, but also recognized them: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” Let’s flip that language to an affirmative form: “Any state may keep troops and ships of war in time of war, . . . and engage in war . . . if actually invaded or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” In other words, states may wage defensive, but not offensive, war. Unlike the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the Constitution imposed no limit on the armies or navies a state may raise during a time of war. (The states are not limited to their militias.) Unlike the Articles, the Constitution laid down no requirement that the war be congressionally-declared and no restriction on the nature of the invasion. The only requirements imposed by the Constitution are that there be an actual invasion or an “imminent Danger” of one. It is common to say that the Constitution reduced state power from what it had been under the Articles of Confederation. But this was not true in the area of warmaking. Another point about the states’ reserved powers: The Constitution did not abolish state capacity to enforce the law against criminals. Which brings us to the next topic. “Enemies of the Human Race” During the 18 th century, civilized nations often were disturbed by criminal gangs that recognized no sovereigns. Legal writers called these gangs, hostes humani generis — a Latin phrase meaning “enemies of the human race.” Enemies of the human race might operate on the sea, prey on shipping, and attack port towns. If so, they were called “pirates.” But enemies of the human race also included land-based gangs of thieves, deserters, poisoners, assassins, incendiaries, and (as the legal commentator William Blackstone characterized them) “unauthorized voluntiers [ sic ] in violence.” The Constitution left the states with power to conduct war against invasions launched by enemies of the human race. It also left the states with police power to respond to their criminal acts. The attitudes of the founding generation against these malefactors was remorseless. As Emer de Vattel, the Founders’ favorite international law authority, wrote: “[I]f the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories; we ought to except from this rule, the villains, who by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized . . . .” Can you think of some “enemies of the human race” operating along our Southern border today? The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part II appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
To hear an audio version of this essay read by the author, please click here . his essay was first published in the Jan. 8, 2024 Epoch Times. As unauthorized foreigners continue to flood across the Southern border, state officials continue to cast about for solutions. In normal times, the federal government would remedy the problem. But these are not normal times: The administration of President Joe Biden actually seems to be aiding the influx. State officials are hampered by a Supreme Court doctrine called “ implied federal preemption .” The courts use this doctrine to void some state laws as contradicting federal statutes, even when the federal statutes do not explicitly override them. For example, the Arizona legislature adopted four measures to address illegal immigration. They were consistent with the text of federal immigration statutes. In fact, they sought to further the purpose of those statutes. Yet the Supreme Court voided three of the four, even while admitting the damage illegal immigration was doing to Arizona ( pdf ). Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court struck down a voter initiative denying state services to illegal migrants. Montanans had approved the measure by a nearly 80 percent majority. But the court said it was “preempted” by federal immigration law ( pdf ). The federal pre-emption doctrine has its place, but the courts have overextended it. One reason is the widespread belief in a constitutional myth. The myth is that the Constitution gives the federal government exclusive power over issues of foreign affairs, warfare, and immigration—and that the states have nothing to say on those subjects. But anyone who reads the Constitution carefully can see that this is false. As this series will show, the document’s text explicitly recognizes some state military and immigration authority. The history surrounding the Constitution’s adoption tells us what that authority is. It is true that in many cases, federal action may override state measures. But in other cases, the states may act irrespective of whether the feds approve. This series summarizes state powers over immigration and military force—and particularly the power to respond to illegal border crossings. This series, and the research study on which it is based ( pdf ), may enable the judiciary to correct course. “Invasion” in the Constitution The noun “invasion” appears in the Constitution three times and the verb “invaded” once. Each time, the word triggers, or recognizes, a federal or state government obligation or power to respond. The appearances are as follows: Each state has a militia. Congress may enlist state militias to “repel Invasions.” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15). An “Invasion” may give Congress authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (a traditional protection against imprisonment without trial). (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2). The federal government is obligated to protect each state “against Invasion.” (Article IV, Section 4). A state—independently of the federal government—may engage in war if “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3). Obviously, a lot hinges on the meaning of “invasion” and “invade.” What Does the Constitution Mean by “Invasion?” Does the peaceful, but illegal, flood of immigrants across the border qualify as an “Invasion” as the Constitution uses the term? Put another way, are unauthorized migrants “invading” Texas, Arizona, and other states? Today we use the words “invade” and “invasion” in several ways. Sometimes we mean a full-fledged military assault—as in the phrase, “the 1940 Nazi invasion of France.” But we use the word to cover non-violent actions: “He got so close, he was invading my space,” and “I think that law is an invasion of my rights.” But—and this is critical—what is important for legal purposes is not how we use those words. What is important is how the Constitution uses them. Three U.S. appeals courts have said that the Constitution’s meaning of “invasion” is limited to an attack by a foreign army. On the other hand, the Supreme Court once characterized a group of only eight spies as “invaders” ( pdf ). But none of these tribunals actually investigated how the Constitution uses “invade” and “invasion.” Very few legal scholars—on whom judges often rely—have done so, either. How to Find Out what “Invasion” Means The first stop on the path to learning what the Constitution means by “invaded” and “invasion” is to look up those words in Founding-era (i.e., 18 th century) dictionaries. I collected thirteen editions published between 1713 and 1789. Only one of the thirteen limited “invade” and “invasion” to formal military incursions. The other twelve included the military definitions, but also added definitions like “to intrude,” “to encroach,” and “to enter in a hostile manner.” I also checked the meanings of “intrude,” “encroach,” “hostile,” and other words used in describing “invade” and “invasion.” (For example, in this context “hostile” usually meant only “without permission”). It was clear from the dictionaries that “invasion” covered much more than military assault. The next stop on the journey consisted of the debates over the Constitution itself. They showed that the Constitution’s use of “invaded” and “invade” meant only physical intrusions, not intrusions on rights or personal space. Otherwise, though, the definitions were quite broad, as James Madison noted in Federalist No. 43. They certainly were not limited to attacks by foreign armies. Madison himself, for example, wrote in Federalist No. 41 of attacks along the Atlantic coast by “licencious [ sic ] adventurers . . . daring and sudden invaders.” The phrase included not only formal military operations, but raids by pirates and other illegal opportunists. The next step was to look more widely at 18 th century discourse. It produced similar results. Moreover, the Founders’ books on international law all confirmed that people had no right to enter a sovereign’s territory without the permission of the sovereign. And no nation had the right to assist or allow its citizens to enter another sovereign’s territory without permission. Some Founders Called Illegal Immigration “Invasion” One of the most interesting pieces of evidence came from an actual 18 th century case of illegal immigration. Before the Constitution was adopted, the State of Connecticut had a claim to land in the Wyoming Valley. The Wyoming Valley is the part of modern-day Pennsylvania around Scranton and Wilkes-Barre. Relying on their state’s claim, Connecticut citizens poured into the Wyoming Valley—to the great distress of Pennsylvania authorities. The newcomers settled on rich farm land that, according to Connecticut law, was theirs—but according to Pennsylvania law was not. This immigration into the Wyoming Valley was not a military assault. Local Indians and Pennsylvania officials eventually attacked the settlers, and they resisted. But the immigration itself seems to have been almost entirely peaceful. But to Pennsylvanians, the unauthorized immigration was an “invasion.” In 1754, Benjamin Franklin authored a plan “to divert the Connecticut Emigrants from their Design of Invading this Province.” And in 1783 the Pennsylvania legislature wrote to the Confederation Congress, labeling the Connecticut settlers “invaders of the State.” Conclusion The Constitution’s words “invaded” and “invasion” include unauthorized mass migration into the United States or into individual states. Unauthorized mass migration therefore triggers certain government powers and duties—state as well as federal. The following installments in this series will explain what those powers and duties are. The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part I first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Understanding the Constitution: How States May Respond to Illegal Immigration—Part I appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here. A common tactic among opponents of an amendments convention is to label it a “constitutional convention,” and then claim that a constitutional convention is inherently unlimited. The fact that courts have repeatedly limited constitutional conventions seems not to have occurred to them. New scholarship by Roman J. Hoyos, a law professor at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, traces the growth of the legal understanding that even a constitutional convention can be limited. His publication is entitled Article V and the Law of Constitutional Conventions , and it appeared in the British Journal of American Legal Studies ( pdf ). Professor Hoyos gives credit to John Alexander Jameson, the leading 19th century convention scholar, as playing a pivotal role in the understanding that constitutional conventions can be limited. Jameson distinguished constitutional conventions—which are subject to law and legal restrictions—from unlimited “revolutionary conventions.” Examples of the latter were the “committees of correspondence” set up in states just before and during the American Revolution. Professor Hoyos discusses some of the many judicial opinions that have declared limits on constitutional conventions. He then shows that an Article V convention has even less scope than a constitutional convention. One reason is that an Article V convention’s power is limited to “proposing Amendments.” Amendments are narrower than general constitutional revision, which most constitutional conventions are empowered to do. He points out also that an Article V convention’s power terminates once it has turned its proposals over the Congress for referral to the states. Professor Hoyos credits a historian named George Parkinson with labeling a convention designed to circumvent a legislature, a “circumvention convention.” An Article V convention is of that species, because it was designed to enable state representatives to propose amendments without Congress. Toward the end of the article Professor Hoyos lists multiple ways in which limits on an Article V convention can be enforced. The post Even Constitutional Conventions are Limited first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Even Constitutional Conventions are Limited appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . A version of this essay first appeared in the December 28, 2023 Epoch Times. Can former President Donald Trump be disqualified from another presidential term? The answer to that question partly hinges on the answer to this one: Does the “disqualification” language in the Constitution’s 14 th amendment apply to a candidate seeking the presidency? In the Colorado case on the subject, the trial judge answered “No, it doesn’t.” She concluded that the 14 th amendment’s disqualification language applies to many offices, but not to the presidency. Therefore, she dismissed the case against President Trump. But the state supreme court answered “Yes ,” and reversed the trial judge. This issue probably will not go away. The judiciary of other states and the U.S. Supreme Court may have to consider it. The 14 th Amendment and the Colorado Supreme Court Section 3 of the 14 th amendment disqualifies anyone who has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [United States]” from certain listed offices. The listed offices include Congress, presidential electors, and “any office . . . under the United States . . . .” The presidency and vice presidency are not listed—at least not explicitly. However, the justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, like many other writers, claimed the presidency is included because it is an “office . . . under the United States.” The Colorado justices wrote, “When interpreting the Constitution, we prefer a phrase’s normal and ordinary usage over secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” But that comment sells the Constitution’s framers short. They were highly skilled legal drafters who knew what they were doing. The document they produced was straightforward. It had no “secret” meanings—even if modern writers ignorant of 18 th century conditions might think it did. The court’s comment also sells short the people who ratified the Constitution. The founding generation was an unusually literate one in legal matters. The phrase “Office under the United States” was the obvious successor to the extremely common British term “office under the Crown.” As former subjects of the British Empire, members of the founding generation had heard and used that expression all their lives. We must never assume the Constitution’s ratifiers did not understand a legal phrase in a legal document as important, as closely examined, and as widely discussed as the Constitution. What Does the Original Constitution Mean by “Office Under the United States?” The Colorado justices disregarded substantial evidence that when the Constitution uses the phrase “Office under the United States,” it refers only to appointed offices such as the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury. This evidence suggests “Office under the United States” does not include elected offices, such as Senators, Representatives, the Vice President, or the President. Here is the background: The Constitution uses certain key terms over and over again. Among them are the words “Office” and “Officer.” Sometimes the Constitution does not modify those words. But on other occasions, the Constitution adds phrases, such as “of United States” or “under the United States.” Over a decade ago, Seth Barrett Tillman , an American legal scholar working in Ireland, noticed that the use of these “office” phrases is not haphazard. He found patterns. These patterns appear both in the drafting process and in the finished Constitution. Prof. Tillman also identified other historical facts consistent with the patterns. Since that time, Prof. Tillman has been joined by another legal scholar, Josh Blackmun . Together, they have tried to reconstruct the meanings of all these words and phrases. They concluded that, as the Constitution suggests, the bare term “Office” includes the presidency. But they also concluded that when the Constitution modifies that word with “of the United States” or “under the United States,” it means only appointed officers. (They also found a distinction between “officer of” and “officer under,” but that distinction is not important here.) Professors Tillman and Blackmun therefore determined that neither “Office of the United States” or “Office under the United States” includes elected positions. Excluded are members of Congress, the President, and Vice President. Professors Tillman and Blackmun back this up with a fair amount of proof. For example: In British practice the term “officers under the Crown” referred only to appointed, not elected, positions. The Constitution states that the President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States” (Article II. Section 3). In other words, the President gives each officer of the United States papers that confirm and explain the officer’s authority. But commissioning yourself would be, shall we say— awkward. And no one has ever seriously suggested that the President must commission himself or other elected officials. So the President must not be an “Officer of the United States.” The Constitution (Article II, Section 4) authorizes impeachment of “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States.” If the President and Vice President were officers of the United States, there would be no need to list them separately. The Constitution treats the oaths of the President and members of Congress separately from the oaths of “Officers of the United States.” Then there is the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause (Article I, Section 9, Clause 8). It prohibits officers under the United States from accepting gifts from foreign officials. Yet President George Washington accepted such gifts without any public objection. True, most people were leery of criticizing Washington, but President Thomas Jefferson was otherwise criticized savagely, but not for the gifts he received from foreign officials. All this suggests that the members of the founding generation did not think of the President as an “Officer under the United States.” During President Washington’s first term, the Senate asked Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to make a list of all officers “under the United States.” Hamilton’s list included all appointed positions. It excluded all elected ones, including the presidency. I am not saying the Tillman-Blackmun evidence is conclusive. Some of the events they rely on occurred after the Constitution was ratified. As I have explained elsewhere , such evidence generally should receive little weight in reconstructing how the ratifiers understood the Constitution several years earlier. On the other hand, the Tillman-Blackmun evidence from the 1790s does have the virtue of being uncontradicted. What Does the 14 th Amendment Mean by “Office under the United States?” I began to immerse myself in the record of the American Founding over 30 years ago. Much later, I turned my attention to the adoption of the 14 th amendment. Congress proposed that amendment in 1866, and its ratification was completed in 1868. What I discovered is that those responsible for the 14 th amendment—drafters, proposers, and ratifiers—mostly were well-meaning. But they were nowhere near as competent as the framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution. Those responsible for the 14 th amendment simply did not have the Founders’ wide knowledge, drafting ability, or understanding of what they were trying to say. This, I believe, is a principal reason disputes over so many key 14 th amendment phrases continue to afflict us today. There is a rule of legal interpretation that tells us what to do when faced with this kind of uncertainty. The rule is that when an amendment uses a word or phrase from the original Constitution, we should presume that the amenders used the phrase the same way the original Constitution does. This suggests that “office under the United States” in the 14 th amendment means the same thing as in the original Constitution. To my knowledge, there is no strong evidence to the contrary. So if the president is not an “officer under the United States” in the original Constitution, then he’s not one in the 14 th amendment either. Why Exclude the President? Why would those responsible for the 14 th amendment disqualify a former insurrectionary from most other offices, but not from the presidency? This is another area in which the amendment’s drafters and ratifiers were exasperatingly unclear. But here are some possible reasons: First: All of the disqualified officers listed in the 14 th amendment are chosen within individual states. Without a disqualification rule, the chances were good that one-time Confederate states, such as Virginia and Mississippi, might choose former Confederate insurrectionaries to serve in state positions or in Congress. On the other hand, the President is elected nationwide. When the 14 th amendment was adopted, the eleven former Confederate states comprised less than a third of all states. And they held less than a quarter of the national population. The chances of a former Confederate being elected President were effectively “zero.” Second: Although the presidency is a national office, the mechanics of presidential elections are fixed by state officials within each state. If a presidential candidate could be challenged as a former insurrectionary, state officials would have to determine whether this was true. The conclusion might differ from state to state—resulting in the very situation that threatens us now. The threatened uncertainty may have induced those responsible for the 14 th amendment to avoid that risk by excluding presidential candidates from formal disqualification. After all, the chances of a former Confederate being elected President were nil anyway. Third: The 14 th amendment permits Congress, by a two-thirds vote of each house, to remove a disqualification. Those responsible for the 14 th amendment may have concluded that if a former rebel was, by some miracle, elected President, his election represented forgiveness by an authority even higher than Congress: the people of the United States. Fourth: If the presidency were among the offices from which a candidate could be disqualified, a former insurrectionary seeking the job might bargain with Congress to remove the disqualification. This could lead to all sorts of corruption. It might also result in the presidency’s submission to Congress. These are all serious considerations. They should not be dismissed lightly. The post Why It May be Impossible to Disqualify Trump from the Presidency first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Why It May be Impossible to Disqualify Trump from the Presidency appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . This essay first appeared in the Dec. 18, 2023 Epoch Times. Former President Donald Trump has said that, if he is re-elected, he may use the militia or armed forces to suppress violence and looting. His legal basis consists of five sections of federal law collectively called the “Insurrection Act.” President Trump apparently was recalling the Black Lives Matter/Antifa riots of 2020—riots occurring mostly in cities and states controlled by “progressive” officeholders who failed to take effective action against them. Left-of-center outlets have called Trump’s remarks dangerous and dictatorial. The truth, however, is complicated. Here is a more objective view of what a President can, and cannot, do under the Insurrection Act. The Insurrection Act’s Legal Role The United States has never had a general national police force. Under our Constitution, most law enforcement is a state, not a federal responsibility. Federal police generally have been limited to narrow functions, such as operating on federal land and protecting federal buildings. This may be one reason the U.S. has never had an absolute dictator. In Europe, ambitious politicians (such as Adoph Hitler) have used national police forces as tools for imposing their will. Indeed, this history of national police forces is one reason expansion of the FBI’s functions has been so alarming. The Insurrection Act is an exception to the general rule that the U.S. Government doesn’t do local policing. The significance of that is explained below. Three of the Law’s Five Sections The Insurrection Act consists of Sections 251 through 255 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. We can dispose of three of those sections quickly: Section 251 allows the President to use the militia and armed forces to assist a state in suppressing an insurrection—but only if the state requests help. Section 251 carries out part of the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause (Article IV, Section 4). The Guarantee Clause obligates and empowers the U.S. Government to protect a state against domestic violence—but, again, only when the state requests help. Trump probably could not use this section to suppress violence in Democrat states because officials in those states are unlikely to request help. During the 2020 riots in Portland, Oregon, for example, Trump offered federal assistance, but the state governor and city mayor told him to stay out. Section 254 says that before the President uses the militia or the armed forces under the Insurrection Act, “he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.” This merely gives the mob a chance to break up before federal troops move in. Section 255 clarifies that the Insurrection Act applies to Guam and the Virgin Islands as if they were states. Section 253 If Trump wishes to proceed against the wishes of Democrat state officials, he will have to use Section 252 or Section 253. Let’s examine them in inverse order. Section 253 authorizes the President to use the militia or U.S. Armed Forces in two situations. One arises when state authorities block enforcement of federal law. It is a restatement of part of Section 252, which we’ll examine below. The other situation is more interesting. It allows the President to call out the military when domestic violence “so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection.” To simplify: For the President to act under this section, there has to be (1) violence (2) that prevents people from exercising named constitutional rights, and (3) state and local authorities don’t protect those rights. This section might apply if “woke” state university officials look the other way while mobs prevent conservative students from exercising their constitutional right to free speech. It also might apply if local authorities refuse to stop Hamas-inspired mobs from destroying Jewish synagogues—thereby interfering with freedom of religion. Most of the 2020 violence President Trump was thinking of was not the kind that violated rights “named in the Constitution.” The Constitution requires state governments to comply with “due process of law,” but it doesn’t list specific rights against hooligans robbing you or smashing your windows. Section 252 Section 252 reads as follows: “Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.” The term “laws of the United States” means federal, not state, laws. Generally speaking, garden-variety riots snd looting are violations of state rather than federal law. And although federal criminal law has expanded dramatically over the last few decades, serious constitutional questions remain about how far the federal government can go in regulating the kind of violence that afflicts Democrat-run cities. To employ Section 252, therefore, President Trump would have to point to specific violations of federal statutes. One example might be an attack on a U.S. courthouse. Another might be mob attempts to intimidate Supreme Court justices in violation of federal law, such as occurred in 2022. Also, Section 252 applies only when it becomes “impracticable” to enforce the law “by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” Presumably this means that the courts are not open and operating. Mere disagreement about how the law is being enforced probably is not enough. Some counter that the President has unchecked power to interpret Section 252 because of the phrase “Whenever the President considers . . . .” They point to a very old Supreme Court case— Martin v. Mott (1827). That case stated that the President is “the sole and exclusive judge” of when to use his powers under the Insurrection Act. But Martin v. Mott did not construe Section 252 as it exists today. It reviewed the President’s power to call out the militia in case of invasion , not domestic violence. Responding to invasion does not present the same risks of dictatorship as domestic policing does. There are further reasons the courts are unlikely to allow the president unlimited discretion: The courts almost never rule that a federal official can do whatever he wants, whatever the consequences. Even though officials have a lot of discretion, that discretion almost always has limits. Martin v. Mott was based on the premise that the President would always have “high qualities . . . public virtue, and honest devotion to the public interests.” History since 1827 has thoroughly disproved that premise! The Insurrection Act is an exception to the general rule that the feds don’t do domestic policing. Judges usually interpret general rules widely, but exceptions narrowly. In sum: The Insurrection Act may be a viable alternative for preventing “woke” officials from cooperating with mobs in suppressing specific constitutional rights—such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, trial by jury, and the right to keep and bear arms. It probably is not a viable tool for responding to garden-variety rioting and looting. Nor, in view of the sordid history of national policing, should it be. The post What Trump Could—and Couldn’t Do—Under the Insurrection Act first appeared on Independence Institute . The post What Trump Could—and Couldn’t Do—Under the Insurrection Act appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . This essay first appeared in the Dec. 21, 2023 Epoch Times. There were two fundamental flaws in the Colorado Supreme Court’s 4-3 decision removing former President Donald Trump from the Colorado 2024 election ballot. The first was that the justices reversed the lower court without seriously addressing the issue the lower court found decisive. The second was that the proceeding, like some others against the former President, did not grant him adequate due process. Before getting deeper into those subjects, let’s examine how the case arose and mention some things the Colorado justices did get right. Colorado law empowers the secretary of state, as chief elections officer, to decide who has qualified for the ballot. After the secretary of state placed President Trump on the ballot, a group of anti-Trump Republicans and Independents petitioned to have him removed. State law provides an expedited (very fast) procedure for election challenges. This procedure enabled the petitioners to bypass the “standing to sue” problems that have thwarted similar lawsuits in other states, and which I discussed in an earlier column . The petitioners argued that the expedited procedure could be used to remove a candidate not qualified for the office he seeks. This argument probably was correct. However, qualification lawsuits usually center on straightforward questions like “Does the candidate live in the district?” and “Does the candidate meet the age requirement?” The issues in the Trump case were far more complicated. The plaintiffs argued that President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” against the United States, and was thus disqualified by Section 3 of the 14 th amendment: That section provides (note the italicized words): “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office . . . under the United States , or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.” After expedited proceedings, the trial judge found that President Trump engaged in insurrection during the days leading up to Jan. 6, 2021. But the judge also concluded that the presidency was not covered by Section 3 of the 14 th amendment. The judge noted that Section 3 mentions members of Congress and presidential electors but does not mention the President. So the presidency is covered only if it is an “office under the United States.” After examining the Constitution’s text and historical evidence, she concluded that, although the President is an “officer,” he is not an “officer under the United States” as the Constitution uses that phrase. Thus, the judge denied the petition to strike President Trump from the Colorado ballot. The petitioners thereupon appealed to the state supreme court. What the Colorado Supreme Court Got Right On Dec. 19, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion per curiam —that is, ”for the court.” This means no single person was the author. Four of the seven justices signed onto it. They were Justices Monica Márquez, Melissa Hart, Richard Gabriel, and William W. Hood. The three dissenters each wrote separate opinions. They were Chief Justice Brian Boatright, and Justices Carlos Armando Samour and Maria Berkenkotter. The court had to address quite a few issues, requiring a lengthy opinion (133 pages). The majority got two of those issues right. First, the court pointed out that under the U.S. Constitution, presidential elections are subject to state, not federal, control. Although the Constitution gives Congress power to override state congressional election laws, the Constitution does not give Congress similar power to override state presidential election laws. (The principal exception is that Congress may fix the time for choosing the Electoral College and the day on which the Electoral College votes.) The Supreme Court also got a related issue right. The Trump lawyers—and one of the dissenting justices—argued that Section 3 of the 14 th amendment was not “self-executing.” In other words, they argued that it is a dead letter unless Congress defines and enforces it, which Congress has not done. They point to Section 5 of the 14 th amendment, which gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by “appropriate legislation.” There are several problems with that argument. First, the fact that Congress has power to adopt laws enforcing the amendment does not mean it must do so before the amendment is effective. Second, although the amendment granted Congress power to remove a disability, it pointedly did not grant power to create a disability. Third, Section 5 is what is called an “incidental powers” clause. This means its scope is quite limited. Congress has passed a law making insurrection a crime (18 U.S.C., Section 2383). Violation of that law leads to disqualification. It is unclear what portion of the Constitution gives Congress authority to pass such a law, but it probably is not the 14 th amendment. What the Court Probably Did Wrong Several scholars have concluded that Section 3 of the 14 th amendment does not apply to the President because (they say) the presidency is not, in the Constitution’s phrase, an “office under the United States.” They present an impressive amount of evidence suggesting that when the Constitution was ratified, people thought of the President as an officer, but not as an “officer under the United States.” That phrase referred only to an appointed officer , such as the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of the Senate. The trial judge found the evidence from the ratification era persuasive, but the Colorado Supreme Court largely ignored it. Instead, the majority contended that excluding the President didn’t make sense, because then he would not be covered by the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause (Article I, Section 9, Clause 8), which prevents officers under the United States from accepting gifts from foreign powers. However, important evidence shows that the people who ratified the Constitution did not, in fact, consider the President to be covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The justices ignored that point, too. What the Court Definitely Did Wrong President Trump repeatedly has been denied due process of law. This happened in the first and second impeachment trials, and at the House of Representatives’ “Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol.” (We’ll call it the “Jan. 6 Committee.”) And it just happened again in Colorado. President Trump has never been convicted—or even charged—with insurrection. President Biden’s Justice Department, which has not been reluctant to prosecute political opponents (including President Trump), has never proceeded against him under the federal insurrection statute. The likely reason for this is that the prosecutors know there is not sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. As I have stated in a previous column, I think there should be a conviction for criminal insurrection before a person is disqualified. The Colorado trial judge nevertheless allowed the suit to proceed. As a result, she had to determine whether the Jan. 6 riot really was an insurrection—and, if it was, whether Trump knowingly promoted it. These are difficult issues, and they require preparation, tested evidence, and time to resolve. As the dissenting justices pointed out, disqualification for public office is a drastic punishment that should be inflicted only after compliance with all due process standards: timely notification, disclosure of evidence among the parties, an impartial adjudicator, the right to call witnesses, the right to cross-examine, time to prepare, and—because of the seriousness of the punishment—proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Expedited proceedings might be fine for determining whether a person meets an age requirement, But they are totally inadequate for trying the complex issue of whether the former president engaged in insurrection. For that reason, the trial judge should have dismissed the case. The correct path for the petitioners would have been to convince a prosecutor to seek a criminal conviction for insurrection or (assuming petitioners have standing) to commence a regular civil proceeding. Possibly because the expedited-hearing time was so limited, the trial judge compounded her mistake by heavy reliance on “evidence” from the Jan. 6 committee. The Colorado Supreme Court’s most serious mistake was approving this procedure. Material from the Jan. 6 committee is hearsay, which means it cannot be cross-examined. True, the Supreme Court pointed out that an exception to the hearsay rule exists for “factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.” But the Jan. 6 committee’s spectacle was not an “investigation” as that term usually is understood. It was a show trial : All the members of the committee had voted to impeach Trump on the same charges. All Trump supporters were kept off the committee. The Trump team was not permitted to introduce evidence, challenge evidence, or cross-examine witnesses. Evidence was admitted, highlighted, suppressed, or manipulated to achieve pre-determined results. The committee hearings were staged events designed to destroy a political opponent. Joe Stalin couldn’t have done it better. In sum, material from the Jan. 6 committee has no place in a courtroom. The Future If the Colorado Supreme Court decision survives review by the U.S. Supreme Court—and I suspect it will not—we can imagine the future. It will be like this: If the federal or state establishment opposes a popular political candidate, then Congress or the state legislature will conduct a show trial and issue a report “proving” the candidate is guilty of insurrection. The candidate’s opponents then will sue in a sympathetic court to remove that politician from the ballot, using the report as “evidence.” The court will remove the opposing politician from the ballot, and the voters will never be heard. Is that the future we want? The post The Colorado Supreme Court’s Decision Disqualifying President Trump first appeared on Independence Institute . The post The Colorado Supreme Court’s Decision Disqualifying President Trump appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . This essay first appeared in the December 12, 2023 Epoch Times. The Hamas terror attack of October 7 triggered an overwhelming display of support among American Christians for Jews and for Israel. This continues a long history of support, dating back to the American Founding. As a Jew, I gratefully acknowledge it. Speaking of Christian good will toward Jews and Judaism may seem odd, because we so often focus on anti-Semitism. Of course, there has been plenty of that, and the ugliness often has been perpetrated by self-styled “Christians.” But there is a very different American tradition as well. It is symbolized at this season of the year by the intertwining of Hanukkah and Christmas. The tradition surfaces in the historical records about the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and has remained dominant throughout our history. The Constitution Opens Political Office to Jews Contrary to a common myth, few of the Constitution’s framers were deists or skeptics. Nearly all were Christians, including two Catholics. Benjamin Franklin often is cited as a deist, but as his famous plea for daily prayer at the convention demonstrated, he had long since abandoned deism. At the time of the convention, he held a non-Christian belief in a personal God: in fact, his faith was very close to Judaism. In 1787, each state required that all political officeholders be Christians or—like Franklin—at least willing to admit that the New Testament, if not fully true, had been divinely inspired. During the proceedings, Jonas Phillips, a leader of the Philadelphia Jewish community, wrote to convention president George Washington. Following is part of what Phillips wrote. (The spelling variations are in the original): “It is well known among all the Citizens of the 13 united States that the Jews have been true and faithful whigs [i.e., supporters of the Revolution], and during the late Contest with England they have been foremost in aiding and assisting the States with their lifes and fortunes, they have supported the Cause, have bravely faught and bleed for liberty which they Can not Enjoy— “Therefore if the honourable Convention shall in ther Wisdom think fit and alter the said oath and leave out the words to viz—”and I do acknoweledge the scripture of the new testement to be given by devine inspiration” then the Israeletes will think them self happy to live under a goverment where all Relegious societys are on an Eaquel footing—I solecet this favour for my self my Childreen and posterity and for the benefit of all the Isrealetes through the 13 united States of america.” Perhaps not coincidentally, the finished Constitution contained this remarkable provision (Article VI, Section 3): “The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Eighteenth-century Anglo-American law required that for one to take a valid oath or affirmation, one must believe in God. The law had long recognized that Jews and other non-Christian theists could take valid oaths. But now, for perhaps the first time in history, a nation’s leaders proposed opening political office to all theists—not merely those subscribing to one or more favored religions. Christian Founders Push Back Against Anti-Semitism We do not know for certain, although we can infer, that Phillips’ letter triggered the Constitutional Convention’s decision to ban religious tests. But other indications of the Founders’ favor toward American Jews are unmistakable. Each state held a popularly-elected convention to ratify (or reject) the Constitution. At the Massachusetts and North Carolina gatherings, some of the Constitution’s opponents grumbled that the document would permit Jews and other non-Christians to hold public office. For this, the Constitution’s supporters made no apologies. On the contrary, they responded aggressively—decrying intolerance and pointing out that there were good men of all faiths. At the Massachusetts convention, some of the delegates who took the lead in making the case for religious inclusiveness were Christian clergymen ( pdf ). Christian Leaders Include Jews in Constitutional Celebrations After New York State ratified the Constitution, New York City civic leaders planned a day of celebration. They inadvertently chose a Jewish fast day—Tisha b’Av, which commemorates the destruction of both the first and second Jerusalem temples. When the Jewish community pointed out that the chosen time would prevent them from participating, the organizers moved the day to accommodate them. A similar ceremony was held in Philadelphia. It was marked by a festive parade through the city. Among the eyewitnesses was Dr. Benjamin Rush, America’s leading physician, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and among the Constitution’s ratifiers. Here is part of what he wrote: “The Clergy formed a very agreeable part of the Procession—They manifested, by their attendance, their sense of the connection between religion and good government. They amounted to seventeen in number. Four and five of them marched arm in arm with each other, to exemplify the Union. Pains were taken to connect Ministers of the most dissimilar religious principles together, thereby to shew [sic] the influence of a free government in promoting christian charity. The Rabbi of the Jews, locked in the arms of two ministers of the gospel, was a most delightful sight. There could not have been a more happy emblem contrived, of that section of the new constitution, which opens all its power and offices alike, not only to every sect of christians, but to worthy men of every religion.” George Washington States His Support On May 29, 1790, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution—the last of the original 13 states to do so. Three months later, President George Washington visited Rhode Island. On Aug. 18, he took time to write to the congregation of the Touro Synagogue in Newport. The letter celebrated American progress beyond the mere religious “toleration” acknowledged by British law and toward recognizing that freedom of religion was not merely something to be tolerated, but an inherent human right. President Washington’s letter concluded: “May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid. May the father of all mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy.” What is extraordinary about these displays of friendship is that they occurred at a time when people tended to be religiously isolated, so it was easy to demonize those of a different faith. But the American Founders rose above that. A Lesson Learned It is almost always wise, as well as decent, to respond positively to offers of friendship. This is particularly important for a small religious minority. American Jews have friends everywhere, but those friends often are too little appreciated. Many American Jews have placed their trust instead in left-leaning political groups, universities, and foundations. In some cases, we have given enormous amounts of help to people who surreptitiously hate us. In the wake of October 7, those institutions failed us and the hate came out into the open. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of Christians—and particularly conservative Christians—stuck with us. For that we should be grateful. The post Christian Support for American Jews Began at the Founding first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Christian Support for American Jews Began at the Founding appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . This essay was first published in the December 4, 2023 Epoch Times. One of the few ways the people can check an overreaching judiciary is by passing constitutional amendments. At the federal level, the people reversed U.S. Supreme Court decisions through the 11 th , 14th, and 26 th amendments. At the state level, the people sometimes use the citizen initiative process to curb activist judges. The citizen initiative process allows anyone to circulate a petition to put a proposal on the ballot so the people can vote on it. This prevents judicial oligarchy. It also is a “safety valve” for popular discontent. So alarm bells should go off when a state supreme court hijacks the amendment process itself. To some extent, this has happened in several states—including, for example, Oregon and Pennsylvania. But nowhere has it gone as far as in Montana, where the state’s highest court has asserted an absolute veto over what the people may add to their own constitution. Some Background Montana once was a populist state where, in close questions, judges tended to defer to the popular will. In Montana, as elsewhere, the terms of a state constitutional amendment were fixed by the content of the proposal offered to, and approved by, the people. The Montana constitution, like that of many other states , has a “separate vote” requirement. This was not designed to control the content of amendments. It was designed to promote democracy by preventing officials from bundling amendments to force the people to vote “yes” or “no” on the entire package. The “separate vote” rule assured that if, for example, the legislature proposed two amendments and the people proposed one by petition, the voters could vote differently on each. Traditionally, the only restriction on a Montana amendment’s content was that when the legislature proposed, it had to meet the same single-subject rule applied to other bills. Even this loose standard did not apply to voter initiatives. The Montana Supreme Court Becomes Hyper-Activist For several decades, however, the Montana Supreme Court has been hyper-activist. Since 1982, the tribunal has an almost unbroken record of upholding liberal ballot measures and striking down conservative ones. In November, 1998, against all odds, the voters approved Constitutional Initiative 75. This was a tightly-drafted measure to allow the people to vote on most tax increases. CI-75 was what scholars call a “tax and expenditure limitation” or “TEL.” The drafters of CI-75 (of which I was one) sought to avoid defects in other state TELs. We did so by clarifying terms and adding enforcement mechanisms. All of the terms were integral to accomplishing CI-75’s purpose. For clarity, CI-75 identified three sections of the constitution being changed. There was little dispute that CI-75 complied with existing law Yet a few months later, in Marshall v. Montana ( pdf ), the state supreme court voided CI-75. To do so, it adopted a novel interpretation of the “separate vote” requirement. The justices claimed that because CI-75 expressly changed three sections of the constitution, it was really three amendments that had to be voted on separately. Furthermore, the justices overruled several of their own case precedents and imposed the change retroactively on an election already held! Of course, anyone who reads a constitution knows that nearly all amendments—even the narrowest—alter more than one part of the pre-existing document. Some amendments, such as the 5 th and 14 th in the U.S. Constitution, sprawl over multiple topics. Marshall v. Montana achieved its purposes, however: The court converted the “separate vote” requirement from a rule to promote popular sovereignty into a rule to limit popular sovereignty. It denied the people the right to vote on the taxes they pay. It asserted a veto over the people’s approval of constitutional amendments. And it deeply discouraged conservative and pro-freedom activists. The Court Extends Its Power Further In 2016, Montanans voted to add CI-116, a crime victims’ bill of rights (“Marsy’s Law), to the state constitution. This time, the drafters were careful not to specify parts of the constitution being amended. But the court still voided it. In Montana Ass’n of Counties v. Fox ( pdf ), the court pointed out that an amendment can change several parts of a constitution even if it doesn’t say so. Less plausibly, the justices added that (1) any language added to the constitution would be counted as one amendment and (2) the effect of that language would be counted as a second amendment. This rendered it literally impossible for any amendment to be counted just as one. Then the court went on to say that any “substantive” changes had to be “closely related” for the measure to survive. What did the court mean by “substantive” and “closely related?” No one really knows, and the court hasn’t provided much guidance. In the CI-116 case, for example, the court ruled that a victim’s right to be present at the defendant’s bail hearing was “not closely related to victims’ rights”—even though a major part of many bail hearings is the risk the defendant might pose to the victim and to others. The Court Vetoes Property Tax Relief—and Makes a Damaging Admission Montanans, like residents of some other Western states, face soaring property tax assessments. This year, petitioners offered a constitutional amendment to rein in property taxes. Their proposed amendment altered only one section of the state constitution. All its terms were, as the court admitted, tightly “conjoined.” Still, the court voided the proposal. And this time it did so even before the electorate had a chance to see it. The case was Monforton v. Knudsen ( pdf ). The justices held that the tax-relief measure changed several parts of the constitution. One purported reason was that it affected functions that happened to be carried out at different levels of government. Another purported reason was that it added a cap on tax hikes to its cap on property assessments. The court said these changes were not “closely related.” As in the previous two cases, it didn’t matter that they were integral to carrying out the amendment’s purpose. In Monforton , the court also held that all “separate vote” challenges had to be brought before the people made a decision—that the Montana constitution forbids such challenges after the election has been held. This was an admission that the cases voiding the CI-75 and CI-116 elections had been illegitimate. The Rules Change for a Liberal Amendment Those of us who regularly follow the Montana Supreme Court predicted that it would never apply its impossible-to-meet standards when liberal amendments were challenged. And on November 22, we were proven right. The case was Montanans for Election Reform Action Fund v. Knudsen ( pdf ). At one time, Montana was among those northern states in which the Republican Party was controlled by its “progressive” wing. Gradually, however, the Montana GOP has grown more conservative. As I pointed out in an earlier Epoch Times column , when “progressives” lose under a set of rules they often seek to change the rules. This year they prepared a constitutional amendment to revolutionize Montana’s election laws. The principal purpose of the amendment seems to be this: to make it easier for self-styled “moderate Republicans” to shut out more conservative rivals. The amendment would have another likely result also: to make it easier for the left-of-center minority to win statewide elections by garnering small pluralities in multi-candidate contests . Their proposed amendment would alter several provisions in the Montana constitution. The provisions being changed include candidate qualifications, the legislature’s power to regulate elections, and arguably even the free speech guarantee. (Significantly, the changes exempt Montana Supreme Court justices.) Yet—surprise!—the court upheld this one. It claimed each constitutional change was “integral” to the whole. This was the same justification the court rejected in the prior three cases. The story is a caution to all Americans: The courts have no business determining the content of constitutional amendments. This is the prerogative of the people. It is a prerogative the people should guard jealously. The post When a Court Vetoes the People: It Happened in Montana first appeared on Independence Institute . The post When a Court Vetoes the People: It Happened in Montana appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
Above: The Constitution’s definition of “natural born” derives from that of the British Empire For an audio read by the author, please click here. This essay first appeared in the Nov. 27, 2023 Epoch Times . The Constitution says that only a “natural born citizen” may be president. Throughout history, political partisans have accused opposing candidates of not being “natural born citizens” and thus disqualified. Opponents alleged that President Chester Alan Arthur (R.) (served 1881-1885) was born in Canada and therefore not natural born. In 1964, some questioned the eligibility of Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), who, although an Arizona native, was born three years before that U.S. territory became a state. Senator John McCain (R.), another Arizonan, faced similar questions because he first drew breath in the U.S. Panama Canal Zone. The qualifications of Senator Barack Obama (D.-Ill.) were attacked because his father was a Kenyan. In 2016, opponents of Senator Ted Cruz (R.-Tex.) pointed out that Cruz was born in Canada. His mother was American, but his father was Cuban. Political partisans usually define “natural born” to suit themselves. If the candidate is someone they like, they use a definition that renders their candidate qualified. If the candidate is someone they don’t like, they jigger the definition the other way. None of the current presidential candidates faces this kind of controversy. Let’s take this opportunity to rise above partisanship. Let’s see what the Constitution really means. The Constitution’s Words The Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 5) lays out the following qualifications for President: “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.” Later amendments affected this section. As I pointed out in a recent Epoch Times column , the 14 th amendment may disqualify an insurrectionist from the presidency—although some scholars disagree and so has a Colorado court. More clearly, the 22 nd amendment disqualifies anyone who already has served two presidential terms or one term plus more than two years of a former president’s term. The Supreme Court says these are the only qualifications. Neither Congress nor the states may add to them. Why Does the Constitution Include the “Natural Born” Rule? A naturalized citizen may (although not necessarily) have conflicting loyalties. He or she may love America but retain ties of family or sentiment to the “old country.” If tyrants control the naturalized citizen’s native country and the citizen has family or other interests there, he or she may be vulnerable to blackmail or extortion. English history taught the American Founders the risks of divided loyalty. William of Normandy (“the Conqueror”) (reigned 1066-1087) became king of England, but favored his fellow Norman French over the oppressed English. Charles II (1660-1685), although born in England, spent his early manhood as a refugee in France. After coming to the English throne, he showed his gratitude to the country that had harbored him (and also yielded to his need for cash) by entering a secret treaty with France betraying English interests. King George I (1714-1727) was a German prince who was distracted by his holdings in Germany and never learned to operate within the English political system. These issues didn’t change the English law of royal succession, but they did provoke some other legislation. Parliament decided that only “natural born subjects” could serve in the legislature or in certain other high offices. All of the American Founders were aware of this history. Perhaps some would have liked to see a “natural born citizen” requirement for any federal office. However, when the Constitution was written, the United States had existed for only eleven years. No adults were then natural born American citizens. Further, many people born abroad had proven their loyalty to America by serving in the Revolution. And public opinion was too populist to accept a “natural born” requirement for all high offices. The Constitution-makers compromised. They exempted existing American citizens from the “natural born” requirement. And they limited it to the president—the leader in the sensitive areas of foreign and military policy. In 1804, the founding generation adopted the 12 th amendment, which clarified that the “natural born” requirement applied to the vice president as well. What “Natural Born Citizen” Does NOT Mean If you Google the phrase “natural born citizen,” you will find inconsistent definitions. In part, this reflects the way political partisans abuse the phrase to suit themselves. But it also reflects some honest mistakes. All of the Constitution’s framers and leading ratifiers were born and raised within the British Empire. Sometimes they invoked legal terms like “habeas corpus” or “privileges and immunities” or “natural born.” When they did, they used the meaning derived from English law. This could be different from the meaning in common speech or in other legal systems. The Constitution’s definition of “natural born citizen” is clear. But to find it, you have to go beyond such common sources as the Constitutional Convention debates or the Federalist Papers. You have to study 18 th century English law. That requires examining a series of 17 th and 18 th century English court decisions and parliamentary statutes. And you have to know more than which sources to read. You also have to know how to read them. What makes the search even tougher is that the “natural born” concept was tied up with a related—and quite complicated—legal term called “allegiance.” This also was common knowledge among the American Founders. But most people who write about the Constitution today—including law professors—simply do not have the necessary background for researching 18 th century English law. They have made some highly-publicized mistakes. In 2016, for example, the media trumpeted a Florida law professor’s conclusion that no one born abroad could ever be natural born. The media also promoted an essay by two prominent constitutional attorneys. It claimed that any person who is a citizen at birth is natural born. Still another claim is “Only a person with two citizen parents is natural born.” Yet another is “The Founders adopted the international law definition of ‘natural born.’” All of these claims are false. What “Natural Born Citizen” DOES Mean When you put together the legal sources, here is what you get: First: If a child is born either within the United States or within American territories and either parent is then in “allegiance” to America, the child is a natural born citizen. Most foreigners legally in the country are considered to be in temporary “allegiance.” But a foreign diplomat on American soil (and generally also the diplomat’s spouse) is in allegiance only to the sovereign employing him, not to the United States. His U.S.-born children are not U.S. citizens. Invaders and illegal immigrants are not in “allegiance” to the United States, so their U.S.-bred children are not natural born citizens. Both Barry Goldwater and John McCain qualified for the presidency, because both were born in U.S. territory and their parents were loyal American citizens. Also qualified was Barack Obama, whose mother was American, whose Kenyan father was in the U.S. legally and therefore in temporary “allegiance” to the U.S., and who was born in Hawaii. (Yes, I am familiar with the arguments to the contrary.) As for President Chester A. Arthur—his mother actually bore him in Vermont, not in Canada. Second: A child born outside the United States and U.S. territories is natural born if his father is an American citizen in allegiance to the U.S. If the father has betrayed his allegiance—by, for example, engaging in treasonous activities—then the child is not natural born. Third: If a child is bred outside the United States and U.S. territories and the child’s father is foreign, the child is not natural born. This is true even if his mother was an American citizen in allegiance to the U.S. Thus, in this instance the Constitution applies the unusual rule that the status of the offspring follows that of the father ( partus sequitur patrem ), not the more common legal rule that the status of offspring follows that of the mother ( partus sequitur ventrem ). Federal law makes any foreign-born child of an American mother and a foreign father a U.S. citizen. But federal law can’t change the Constitution. For constitutional purposes, the child is a citizen, but not a natural born one. Fourth: If a child is bred outside American territory but neither parent was an American citizen in allegiance to the U.S., then of course the child is not a citizen at all. The child may be naturalized later, but never becomes natural born. For more information, consult this posting and these sources ( pdf ) ( pdf ). The post What Does the Constitution Mean by “Natural Born Citizen?” first appeared on Independence Institute . The post What Does the Constitution Mean by “Natural Born Citizen?” appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
For an audio read by the author, please click here . This essay first appeared in the Nov. 20, 2023 Epoch Times. When I said in a TV interview that I didn’t know who won the 2020 presidential election, I was expressing a view similar to that held by a very large cohort of Americans . That didn’t stop two left-leaning news websites from targeting me last year with investigative stories. Why? Perhaps they were trying to get me hauled up before the House of Representatives Jan. 6 committee. In American history there have been several contested presidential elections, including in 1960 and 2000. Some people doubted the certified results. But the victors either debated the doubters or ignored them. I don’t know of any election after which the victors excommunicated doubters as secular heretics—“election deniers.” The establishment insistence that everyone sing the same tune about the 2020 election looks too much like “the lady doth protest too much” to be reassuring. I suspect that some of the election affirmers have their own secret doubts. Secret doubts may explain why the establishment media so loudly denied any serious irregularities only hours after the election, before anyone could have conducted a serious investigation. Secret doubts may explain the haste to cite the failure of President Donald Trump’s courtroom strategy as “evidence” of the absence of problems—although nearly all his lawsuits were dismissed on procedural grounds, not on the merits. Secret doubts also may explain the media’s insistence on referring to all claims of election irregularities as allegations of “fraud.” In fact, some of the most serious alleged irregularities were not literally fraudulent. They fit into other categories of wrongdoing. Despite the pervasive claim that the 2020 election was the cleanest presidential contest ever, disturbing bits of circumstantial evidence simply won’t go away. Some bits are merely odd—like the fact that nearly all the bellwether counties voted for President Trump rather than President Biden. Another is that Biden garnered more votes than any other presidential candidate in history, despite his obvious political shortcomings and minimal campaigning. Other bits of evidence are more weighty, and some of these remain undenied and perhaps undeniable. The shady influence of “Zuckerbucks. ” Social media censorship. The widespread disregard of a constitutionally-authorized federal statute requiring a single-day election. The Trump haters at Time Magazine summarized what happened in a post-election piece : “[T]he participants want the secret history of the 2020 election told, even though it sounds like a paranoid fever dream—a well-funded cabal of powerful people, ranging across industries and ideologies, working together behind the scenes to influence perceptions, change rules and laws, steer media coverage and control the flow of information.” Admittedly, Time Magazine claimed this was “not rigging the election; [but] fortifying it.” Sure. At this point, I believe, it is irresponsible to claim categorically that President Trump won. But it is also irresponsible to rule out the possibility that he won. Another element adds to my skepticism: Sixty years of dealing with the far left has taught me that, unlike most conservatives and liberals, they routinely disregard rules they find inconvenient, or, if they deem it useful, they change rules retroactively. This is one of the most repeated, most confirmed lessons from my political experience. I first encountered the phenomenon in the 1964 Goldwater presidential campaign, when I saw normal journalistic standards suspended to ensure Barry Goldwater’s defeat. I saw it again and again in college: For example, just before participating in a formal debate as a proponent of U.S. support for South Vietnam, I learned that the agreed format had been silently changed to disadvantage my side. The political word for the latter kind of conduct is “sandbagging.” It is not good form. In law school, when we students thought the outcome of a case was determined by a rule we had studied, leftist professors admonished us, “Tools not rules!” In other words, rules control nothing; they are merely tools you manipulate for the results you want. The fancy word for this kind of amorality is “instrumentalism,” and it subverts the rule of law. When I was active in politics, I witnessed leftist rule-manipulation with a vengeance. To cite just one example: In 1998, our volunteer civic group won a vote to amend the state constitution so the people could vote on tax hikes. However, the state supreme court was dominated by a leftist majority. In early 1999, the court changed the election rules retroactively to void the result. Yes, that did violate the U.S. Constitution—specifically Section 1 of the 14 th amendment. But rules are only tools, right? At the university where I spent the majority of my academic career, as at most universities, leftists predominated. One year another Republican and I were the only ones applying for tenure. Hence the tenure committee changed the standards retroactively to lift the bar higher than it had ever been before. (Fortunately we both cleared it anyway.) Similarly, when I made a course-change request of a kind always granted to others, the dean and faculty changed the rules retroactively to deny the change. I had to resort to litigation to win what left-of-center faculty members had been routinely granted for years. To cite a more current example: In Colorado, where I now live, “progressive” state politicians lost some public votes cutting tax rates. Their solution was not to persuade the voters better, but to have the legislature change the ballot-language rules to falsely communicate that voting for lower taxes was, essentially, voting to close the schools and open the prisons. The examples go on and on. My point is that ignoring or changing the rules would be perfectly in character for leftists in charge of election machinery. Unlike traditional conservatives and liberals, the predominantly secular leftists who participate in politics often do not have the moral training that comes with committed religious affiliation. Whatever the reason, it is clear that before the 2020 election, many rules were changed or disregarded to benefit Biden and disadvantage Trump. This renders it more credible that other rules were disregarded as well—such as those governing ballot collection, ballot custody, and ballot counting. Historians eventually will write the full story of the 2020 election. There is no use pretending the outcome can be changed now. But the conduct of that election tells us something about the civic virus that now afflicts America. And it highlights the need to assure that we do not repeat the experience in 2024. The post Why I Still Doubt the 2020 Election first appeared on Independence Institute . The post Why I Still Doubt the 2020 Election appeared first on Independence Institute .…
 
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