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Every day we bring you the most important news and feature stories from hundreds of sources in Russia and across the former Soviet Union.
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64 episodes
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Every day we bring you the most important news and feature stories from hundreds of sources in Russia and across the former Soviet Union.
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64 episodes
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×1 Anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova and the BBC unmask the historian responsible for ‘denouncing’ opposition-minded Russians from behind a pseudonym
Ivan Abaturov asks a question during a lecture at the Yeltsin Center A historian from Yekaterinburg is likely behind the pseudonym “Anna Korobkova,” a name used to file hundreds of reports to the Russian authorities denouncing people for supposedly anti-government views. Former college lecturer Ivan Abaturov has allegedly spent years informing the police about “opposition” activity, according to a new investigation by the BBC’s Russian-language service. Meduza summarizes the report’s findings, which rely largely on independent research by anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova. Alexandra Arkhipova, an anthropologist targeted by “Korobkova” two years ago, discovered evidence linking Abaturov to the denunciations. In the fall of 2022, the name “Anna Korobkova” was signed on a letter submitted to Arkhipova’s employer at the time, the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, demanding that she be fired for “immoral acts” during an interview with the opposition network TV Rain. According to “Korobkova,” Arkhipova’s remarks “discredited” Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. In February 2023, Arkhipova began compiling a database of Korobkova-signed denunciations to determine whether they were the work of a single person or multiple individuals (such as a Russian police agency). She also gathered Korobkova-signed letters to journalists and began corresponding directly with the person(s) claiming the identity. By late 2024, Arkhipova had collected 74 messages signed by “Korobkova,” including denunciations against teachers, academics, professors, human rights activists, doctors, and lawyers. Threatening Korobkova-signed letters also reached individuals who had given comments to “foreign agent” media outlets, urging them to pledge not to repeat the infraction. “Korobkova” bragged to the BBC about writing 1,357 denunciations between February and September 2023 alone and filing them with agencies like the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Federal Security Service, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Justice Ministry, and others. In correspondence with Arkhipova, “Korobkova” claimed to have sent 764 such reports to the Russian authorities during the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Arkhipova also discovered a Russian-language Wikipedia page about Korobkova, citing multiple copies of responses from Russian government agencies to Korobkova-signed denunciations. In other words, as Arkhipova noted, the Wikipedia page’s editor had access to the official replies to the Korobkova-signed reports. Collaborating with linguist Daniil Skorkin, Arkhipova compared the Wikipedia article with the Korobkova-signed letters sent to her and several journalists. Using stylometric analysis (a method based on the frequency of certain function words ), they found a strong similarity between the Wikipedia article and the Korobkova-signed letters. The Wikipedia article’s edit history shows it was written by a user named “Arkadiy2023.” This same user uploaded photos to Wikimedia Commons, primarily of events in Yekaterinburg, often held at the Yeltsin Center, taken with a Panasonic DMC-FT4 camera. Before “Arkadiy2023” appeared on Wikipedia in April 2023, only one user in Russia — nicknamed “Ivan Abaturov” — had used this exact camera model. Arkhipova and Skorkin gathered texts written by Abaturov, including his posts on Wikinews, descriptions of Wikipedia edits, social media posts, and comments on various platforms. They compared these to the Korobkova-signed denunciations and letters and reached the following conclusion, according to the BBC: The structure and thematic segments of texts by “Korobkova” and Abaturov were identical, although the order sometimes varied. Denunciations by other authors, also analyzed by Arkhipova and Skorkin, were structured differently. Specific phrases frequently found in Korobkova-signed denunciations, such as “I (categorically) oppose any/all [X],” were also regularly used by Abaturov. […] Furthermore, both Abaturov and “Korobkova” shared unique lexical and grammatical features and made similar errors. For example, they both used a dash instead of the grammatically correct commas when writing mol [“so they say”] to convey indirect speech. Meet the serial snitch who targeted Meduza, years ago Mr. Anti-Globalization Meet Alexander Ionov, the self-described ‘human rights defender’ who demanded that Russia label Meduza a ‘foreign agent’ Additionally, “Korobkova” often began sentences with complex conjunctions like prichem (“moreover”), pri etom (“at the same time”), and to est’ (“that is”). Arkhipova found hundreds of similar examples in Abaturov’s texts. Both frequently used expressions like “this person” or “the given individual” and repeatedly wrote the relative pronoun “which” within a single sentence referring to different objects. Arkhipova also analyzed the autobiographical information revealed in the Korobkova-signed correspondence with her and numerous journalists, finding that some of the data matched what is known about Abaturov from public sources. For example, both were born in 1985, received a humanities education, and worked in teaching. Also, both of their grandfathers had special roles in World War II. In the Korobkova-signed letters, the author attributed their knack for denouncing anti-state behavior to their grandfather, who himself was an NKVD informant during Stalin’s time. BBC journalists learned that “Korobkova” and Abaturov shared the same IP address for filing complaints and denunciations — an IP address registered to the Yekaterinburg Internet provider Insis. According to the investigation, Ivan Abaturov graduated in 2008 with a master’s degree in history from Ural State University, where his academic advisor was Alexey Mosin, a historian who headed the Ural branch of the human rights organization Memorial. Mosin described Abaturov’s reputation among colleagues as ranging “from cautious to hostile.” He noted that Abaturov once threatened a professor, accusing her of giving him unfairly low grades. Mosin also told the BBC about an incident where Abaturov’s grandmother came to the university to demand an explanation for why her grandson was given a “B” instead of an “A.” In 2013, a local court fined Abaturov 5,000 rubles (about $160 at the time) for assault after he allegedly started a fight with a student at the Yekaterinburg Technical College, where he was lecturing at the time. Abaturov denied the charges but claimed that students often pelted him with objects like tin cans, chalk, and pine nuts. Journalists learned that Abaturov began filing complaints with the authorities in the late 2010s and uploading scans of the government’s responses to Wikimedia Commons. Around the same time, he started regularly attending public events in Yekaterinburg, including talks hosted at the Yeltsin Center and monthly demonstrations supporting political prisoners. Abaturov introduced himself as a journalist and wrote about the events for Wikinews. According to the BBC, Abaturov later began writing denunciations under his own name against public figures. For example, in January 2020, scientist and human rights activist Sergei Zykov learned that Abaturov had filed a police report against him. The name “Anna Korobkova” didn’t gain notoriety as a serial snitch until 2022. A source told the BBC that some public figures in Yekaterinburg began to suspect Korobkova was Abaturov’s pseudonym, given the familiar style of the Korobkova-signed denunciations. “He's a historian, and he knows judicial statistics well — better than all lawyers. He supported the war when it started. In private conversations, he’s said denunciations are good. The word donos [‘denunciation’] has a positive connotation for him. He explained that denunciations are a means for civil society to interact with the state,” one public figure in Yekaterinburg who knew Abaturov told the BBC. At the same time, Alexey Mosin says he’s not ready to believe that his former student is responsible for the letters signed with Korobkova’s name, which include several threatening messages addressed to him personally. “I watched him grow as a student. He was a boy with peculiarities (to put it gently), but I still have a special place in my heart for him. You know, you can’t help but feel a special way about your own students. I just can't believe he's capable of this. To behave like this... I still believe he respects me as a teacher,” Mosin told the BBC. In messages on VKontakte, the BBC asked Abaturov if he uses the pseudonym “Anna Korobkova” to write reports against anti-government-minded compatriots. “Greetings. You are mistaken,” he answered. A reporter for the Yekaterinburg-based outlet It's My City reached Abaturov by phone, but he refused to answer the journalist's questions, citing a court order to revoke the publication’s media license and block its website. After the BBC published its investigation on Thursday, Wikipedia permanently blocked Ivan Abaturov's user profile.…
1 ‘Impossible to deny’: Azerbaijani lawmaker demands Russia apologize for allegedly downing passenger plane
Azerbaijani parliamentary deputy Rasim Musabekov has demanded that Russia apologize for causing the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 in western Kazakhstan on Wednesday. “The plane was downed on Russian territory, in the sky over Grozny. This is impossible to deny. […] Those responsible must be held criminally liable and pay compensation for people’s deaths and injuries,” Musabekov told the Azerbaijani news agency Turan. In Russia, “someone is taking certain actions in the media to cover their tracks on this,” the outlet quoted Musabekov as saying. The lawmaker also recalled a 2020 incident in which Azerbaijan shot down as Russian helicopter over Armenia, noting that Baku apologized and vowed to punish those responsible. “This is how civilized relationships work. If an air defense system is working, then the airport should be closed; it should be announced so that nobody will fly there. Therefore the perpetrators must be brought the justice,” he said. Earlier on Thursday, multiple media outlets quoted Azerbaijani government officials as saying that the aircraft’s crash was indeed caused by a Russian anti-aircraft missile. More details Azerbaijani government sources say Russian missile likely downed passenger plane, media reports…
1 Russia’s federal censor blocks Kursk refugees’ online group after criticism of Putin and protest coordination
The Russian social network VKontakte has blocked a community run by refugees from the occupied Sudzha district of the Kursk region after users started posting criticism of Vladimir Putin and using the platform to coordinate protests. Journalists at the news outlet 7x7 were the first to report VKontakte’s decision to restrict the “Sudzha Free Announcements” community, which is now inaccessible inside Russia without a VPN. Internet users in Russia now find a message from the social network stating that it’s been blocked at the request of Roskomnadzor, the federal government’s censor. Last month, refugees used the group to publicize a protest in central Kursk to pressure regional officials to provide better support to families forced from their homes this summer by Ukraine’s cross-border incursion. Several days after the demonstration, a local court fined the main organizer 20,000 rubles ($200) for staging an “illegal” public assembly. Putin later replaced the region’s governor after a complaint by state prosecutors that he failed to compensate refugees for lost housing. Following Vladimir Putin’s end-of-year press conference last week, several community members criticized the president for characterizing Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region as mere “commotion” that caused some Russians to “get scared.” Background The Russians who’ve tasted occupation Meet the desperate relatives of trapped Sudzha residents and the refugees who fled Ukrainian troops in time…
1 Putin welcomes Slovak offer to host possible peace talks on Ukraine war ‘if it reaches that stage’
Vladimir Putin has welcomed an offer from Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to host possible peace negotiations regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. “We’re not against the idea if it reaches that stage. And why not? From our point of view, Slovakia has taken a neutral position,” Putin said after a Supreme Eurasian Economic Council summit on Thursday. Robert Fico met with Putin at the Kremlin on December 22, becoming the third E.U. member state leader (after the prime ministers of Hungary and Austria) to travel to Moscow since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In Europe, Fico is criticized for his “pro-Russian” views. Fico’s office said his visit to Russia was a response to Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent threats to halt Russian gas transit through Ukraine. (Zelensky later called on Slovak police to “take an interest” in Fico’s visit to Moscow.) Recounting their meeting, Putin said Fico was focused “first and foremost” on reaching “a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian situation.” At the same time, Russia’s president vowed to continue “completing all special military operation objectives” in 2025. In May of this year, the Slovak authorities also offered to hold a peace summit to end the Russian-Ukrainian war.…
Participants hold a giant Russian state flag during National Flag Day celebrations in Moscow. August 22, 2024. At the end of 2024, fierce discussion flared up among the Russian anti-Kremlin opposition about the optics of bringing the Russian national flag to protest rallies. One side argued that the flag represents the Russian nation, which takes many forms beyond the current Putin regime; another said that Vladimir Putin and his government effectively own the symbol now. These days, the Russian flag means one thing to most of the world: political and military aggression and war. But in relatively recent history, its meaning has been quite different. Meduza takes a deep dive into the shifting significance of the Russian tricolor. This essay is adapted from an issue of Signal , a Russian-language email newsletter from Meduza. If you enjoyed this piece, stay tuned. We’ve got a book coming in early 2025! In November 2024, prominent members of the exiled Russian opposition held a rally in Berlin. Their aims were unclear, and the rally’s only tangible outcome was a sharp uptick in discussion about the significance of the Russian flag. The majority of the flags at the rally were the Russian anti-war opposition flag , with a blue stripe between two white stripes, and the Ukrainian blue and yellow flag. Still, a few people arrived waving the Russian national flag, and their appearance sparked bitter debates at the rally. People called the flags “fascist tricolors,” “stinking bloody rags,” and the flag “of Putin and his ilk.” Luka Andreyev, a 16-year-old who came to the demonstration carrying an official Russian flag, became the object of close (and often unflattering) scrutiny by journalists, and ended up on Myrotvorets, a Ukrainian website that lists individuals deemed Russian accomplices. But even relatively recently, the Russian tricolor was not as emotionally charged as it is today. Even though we’re outlawed in Russia, we continue to deliver exclusive reporting and analysis from inside the country. Our journalists on the ground take risks to keep you informed about changes in Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Support Meduza’s work today. A symbol of the state The Russian flag is over 300 years old. Peter I designed its current form at the end of the 17th century, but the Tsardom of Moscow had been using the colors white, blue, and red as a state symbol since at least the 1660s. For a period in the second half of the 19th century, the white, blue, and red flag was in competition with a black, yellow, and white flag, which was designed in 1858 by the Russian imperial numismatist Bernhard Karl von Koehne. The tsarist government formally adopted the white, blue, and red banner as Russia’s national flag in 1898. “Alexander II and Nasir al-Din Shah during a Parade on the Tsaritsyn Meadow” by Mihály Zichy. The pavilion in the background of the painting is decorated with black-yellow-white and white-blue-red flags. The Russian tricolor acquired its current emotional charge in the 1980s, when it became a symbol of popular protest against Soviet power. In Russia, as in a number of other parts of the collapsing USSR, supporters of regime change rallied around early-20th century national symbols, thereby emphasizing their wish to reinstate the normal course of national development that they believed the Bolsheviks interrupted. The Ukrainian, Belarusian, Latvian, and numerous other post-Soviet flags have essentially the same origin story. In August 1991, Boris Yeltsin made the tricolor Russia’s official state flag and on December 26, it replaced the red Soviet hammer and sickle above the Kremlin. The flag that flew in place of the Soviet flag in 1991 was actually different from the current Russian flag: its blue and red stripes were slightly different hues, and it had a different aspect ratio. The current flag was approved only in 1993, after the Supreme Soviet was officially disbanded and a new constitution was drafted. (The two flags are distinguished in Russia’s State Heraldic Register .) Some supporters of a democratic Russia say the 1991 version, not the one that patriots wave at pro-Putin rallies and occupying troops raise over bombed-out Ukrainian cities, is the “real” Russian flag. People wave the Russian national flag in celebration after a failed coup d’état attempt . Moscow, August 21, 1991. Boris Yeltsin gives a speech after Russian government forces suppressed the August Coup. Moscow, August 21, 1991. People hold out a giant Russian flag on Red Square during the August Coup. Moscow, August 22, 1991. That line of reasoning is unlikely to persuade critics, though — to most, the Russian tricolor is still the Russian tricolor even if some technical details differ. The flag of democracy or a ‘fascist rag?’ At the end of the 1980s, when the tricolor became a meaningful political symbol, Soviet conservatives, who opposed policy changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, took to calling the flag the “Vlasov rag,” after Andrey Vlasov, a Soviet general who defected to Nazi Germany and nominally led the anti-Soviet Russian Liberation Army. The main argument in favor of the tricolor was basically the same as it is today: the flag has a long history, many important events have happened under it (including unsavory ones) but it is nonetheless a national symbol and its significance can’t be reduced to one historical episode. Bringing a national flag to a protest is an important aspect of political speech all over the world. It shows that protesters maintain a feeling of national unity, however vociferously they may disagree with their current government. A national flag at a protest says that no one has a monopoly on patriotism — not even the state. Until 2008, Russia had a paradoxical law in force prohibiting the free use of state symbols. But then, Russia’s soccer team beat the Netherlands in the European Cup quarterfinals, and thousands of people poured into the streets to celebrate. Many of them were waving Russian flags, and of course no one stopped them. Within a couple of months, the ban was lifted. Russian soccer fans celebrate in downtown Moscow after Russia’s victory over Sweden in a Euro 2008 match. June 19, 2008. Russian soccer fans celebrate Russia’s Euro 2008 quarter-final soccer match victory over the Netherlands. Moscow, June 22, 2008. A year later, the opposition took advantage of this newfound freedom to celebrate Flag Day on August 22. It was a callback to a huge 1991 march, with 100,000 participants walking along Moscow’s New Arbat Avenue behind a huge tricolor banner that had become the emotional symbol of Yeltsin and the democratic reformer’s victory over the Soviet old guard. The liberal opposition turned out a far less massive and triumphant crowd in 2009. Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the Russian authorities would attempt to reclaim Flag Day, banning and dispersing any protests associated with it. Russian tricolor flags were easy to spot during the widespread protests in Russia in the winter of 2011–2012. At that point, it seemed like Russia was on board with the standard practice: the authorities and the opposition could disagree as acrimoniously and confrontationally as possible, but they would do so under one national flag. The “March of Millions” in Moscow protesting against alleged fraud in the presidential election and the upcoming inauguration of Vladimir Putin. May 6, 2012. A Russian policeman stands in front of an anti-Putin rally in central Moscow. January 13, 2012. But then Vladimir Putin took over the presidency again, and domestic politics took a conservative turn. That was the beginning of the era of “traditional values” and state-sponsored patriotism. And the authorities wholly appropriated the tricolor at that point. By 2014, the Russian tricolor flew over annexed Crimea, and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” used variations of the flag. Still, Russian flags flew, alongside Ukrainian ones, at protests against Russia’s aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory. The consensus remained that the tricolor was a symbol of the Russian nation, not only of the Russian state. Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine destroyed that consensus. The invasion started on February 24, 2022, and by February 28 the white-blue-white protest flag started to crop up more and more frequently. The most common version has different colors but the same aspect ratio as the 1991 tricolor. It’s important that this protest flag appeared among émigré communities — and one of the reasons it quickly gained popularity in those circles is that people were simply embarrassed to protest under the flag of an aggressor country. Now, more than two years later, some activists interpret this as an admission of defeat, a surrender without a struggle. Opposition leaders, they say, didn’t even try to reclaim the national flag and instead simply “gave it away” to Putin. A Russian flag unfurled in Mariupol to mark two years since Russia occupied the city. May 20, 2024. Russian airborne forces give cover to a drone in Ukraine’s Kherson region. December 2, 2024. President Vladimir Putin is seen on screen giving an address at a rally and concert on Red Square marking Russia’s proclaimed annexation of four Ukrainian regions. September 30, 2022. The Russian flag and Russia’s war Changes to political symbols often accompany regime change. The Bolsheviks swapped out the Russian tricolor for the red Soviet flag, and then when the Soviets lost power, Russia restored the tricolor. The Nazis traded the German tricolor for the swastika, and then when they were defeated, Germany reinstated its old flag. Italy under Mussolini adopted a green, white, and red tricolor with the royal House of Savoy’s coat of arms in the center; after Mussolini’s overthrow, Italy ditched the coat of arms but kept the tricolor. After the Spanish Republic was proclaimed in 1931, the new government replaced the monarchic flag with a red, yellow, and purple one; then dictator Francisco Franco came to power and returned the monarchy’s red-yellow-red flag. In Iran, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the traditional green, white, and red striped flag lost its ancient emblem depicting a lion and the Sun, replacing it with a stylized inscription of “Allah,” and calligraphic renderings of the phrase “Allahu Akbar” along the edges of the green and red stripes. The old version of the flag (the “Shah’s” version) with the lion and sun remains a symbol of the Iranian opposition. Something similar happened in Belarus. Immediately after Belarus declared independence from the Soviet Union, it adopted a red–white–red striped flag. Conservatives in Belarus, however, ceaselessly reminded their compatriots that Belarusian collaborators used this flag during World War II. The discussion was essentially a perfect analog for the one surrounding the so-called “Vlasov’s rag” in the Russian context, but it was resolved completely differently. In 1995, Aleksandr Lukashenko became the president of Belarus and held a referendum on national symbols, as a result of which the country’s first post-Soviet flag was replaced by what was essentially a remake of the Belarusian SSR’s flag (red with a green stripe on the bottom). Twenty-five years later, during the anti-government protests in 2020, the red–white–red flag became a definitive symbol of the Belarusian opposition. It’s rare for completely new flags to be invented. Protests flags are usually old banners made new: they frequently symbolize a return to a “true path,” from which the opposition believes their country has deviated. The Russian tricolor in 1991, the Iranian “Shah’s” flag, and both post-Soviet Belarusian flags (depending on which path supporters consider to be “true”) fall into this category. The opposition to the authorities in Russia during the early post-Soviet years attempted something similar. Under Tsar Alexander II, the Russian Empire’s state flag was a black, yellow, and white tricolor. Yeltsin appropriated the current white, blue, and red tricolor so successfully that his nationalist-minded opponents brought the imperial flag back as an anti-government symbol. (For some reason, they flipped it upside down, so that the white stripe was on top and the black on one the bottom.) Like the Iranian lion and sun flag and the Belarusian red and white banner, the Russian imperial flag represented an appeal to national history, but it was a history that was already long since forgotten, and that flag never functioned well as a unifying symbol. For a period, it was the flag of avowed nationalists. There was an attempt to make it the flag of Novorossiya, as Russian nationalists call some of the occupied regions of Southern Ukraine, but Novorossiya has yet to come into existence. At this point, almost all Russian nationalists have become Putin loyalists and adopted the official tricolor. A small number are fighting for Ukraine with the Freedom of Russia Legion under the white and blue protest flag. More on Russia’s pro-Ukraine fighters ‘The Legion is returning home’ What we know about the latest reported incursion into Russia by pro-Ukrainian ‘partisans’ Today, Putin and his government “own” the Russian tricolor. Of course, arguments about flags aren’t really about the flags. Rather, they’re an expression of frustration: the Russian opposition is fractured and powerless, and its members know this. The lack of a unifying symbol is only a symptom of the lack of unity as such, an absent sense that a diverse group of people might work together for a common cause. After February 24, 2022, the Russian flag acquired one very specific meaning everywhere in the world. If you see someone on social media using the Russian tricolor in their avatar or user picture, you can make a very decent guess as to how they feel about the war and the Putin regime. This overrides any other feeling you may have about the flag. Russian opposition figures, including Ilya Yashin, Yulia Navalnaya, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, lead a rally in Berlin. November 17, 2024. Any attempts to give the Russian tricolor a new meaning (or to return its old democratic significance) run up against strong resistance that few in the Russian opposition, especially people in emigration, are prepared to overcome. It’s easier to find a new symbol than to have to prove that the flag is Russian , and not Putin’s. Hence, the blue–white–blue flag. The problem is that new symbols immediately take on extra, unintended significance. The anti-Putin opposition uses the same blue and white flag as the Freedom of Russia Legion, a relatively fringe nationalist group. This is always the way: any symbol that claims to represent an entire nation will eventually come to represent people that you, personally, don’t like. That’s what happened with the Russian tricolor, too. The issue isn’t really with the symbol itself, but rather with who has the will to defend the meaning with which the symbol is invested. Read more about the anti-war flag A new symbol of Russia’s anti-war movement Meduza explains the origins of the white-blue-white flag.…
1 Israel’s national airline suspends flights between Tel Aviv and Moscow amid reports that Russian air defenses shot down Azerbaijan Airlines plane
The Israeli commercial airline El Al has reportedly suspended flights between Tel Aviv and Moscow for at least the next week, following early reports that Russian air defenses near Grozny may have fired a missile at an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, causing the aircraft to crash in western Kazakhstan and killing 38 of the 67 people on board. Videos recorded at the crash site revealed damage to the plane — particularly on the tail section — resembling impacts from the fragmentation elements of an anti-aircraft missile. Azerbaijani government sources later confirmed to Euronews that a Russian surface-to-air missile brought down the plane. However, at the time of this writing, Kazakhstani officials have not yet determined the cause of the crash. Further reading Azerbaijani government sources say Russian missile likely downed passenger plane, media reports…
1 Russian high school textbook urges girls to ‘trick rapists’ and not to ‘provoke boys and men’ with short skirts, lipstick, and ‘wild colors’
A ninth-grade health and wellness textbook has caused a minor uproar in Russia after activist Yekaterina Mizulina — more commonly known for championing Internet censorship measures — unearthed excerpts showing dubious advice to young women about navigating the hostile world of male sexual predators. For example, the textbook urges schoolgirls to avoid wearing bright makeup and short skirts to prevent becoming victims of sexual violence, reasoning that such displays “provoke boys and men.” Despite claims from the book’s lead author that it’s not required reading in Russian schools, the victim-blaming lessons offered in the text have raised concerns that at least some schoolchildren are being subjected to a backward education in gender norms. Sergey Vangorodsky, who coauthored The Foundations of Life Safety , told RTVI that Mizulina’s complaints are “unfounded” because the book is not standard reading in Russia’s high school curriculum. However, several readers told Mizulina that the textbook is used in health and wellness classes at schools in Rostov-on-Don, Volgodonsk, and Tambov. It’s also available for sale online. “Given that not all school library collections are updated in a timely manner, it may still be in use in [other] schools. I’m confident that the Education Ministry will investigate the matter,” Mizulina wrote on her Telegram channel. In a section called “Safe Behavior for Girls,” Vangorodsky and his coauthors write that women who are alone with a man “should be prepared for him to develop a desire for intimacy.” Here are some other eyebrow-raising snippets from The Foundations of Life Safety : “Many conflicts and attacks occur due to the victim’s own behavior, signaling through her appearance that she is either ‘ripe for it’ (being in the wrong place at the wrong time), willing (too available), or defenseless (drunk, scared, aroused, [or] overly trusting). Avoid standing out among others with excessive extravagance.” “If you are alone with a man (even one you know well), be prepared for him to develop a desire for intimacy with you. Maintain a relaxed demeanor, but do not try to flirt or tease him, as in an intimate setting, he may interpret your flirting as an invitation to intimacy and your resistance as playacting.” “If you cannot escape or counter a rapist’s weapon or physical superiority, you can still defend yourself by leveraging men’s psychophysiological traits during sexual intercourse and targeting their vulnerable spots. Try to trick the rapist into believing you agree to intimacy, get him to lower his defenses, and then act decisively according to your chosen plan.” “How not to become a victim of violence: When going to a party, a café, a bar, a concert, any large event, or somewhere with a bad reputation, do not wear very short skirts or paint your lips, eyelids, and eyelashes in wild colors. This provokes boys and men and is perceived by them as a signal.”…
Russian federal officials have declared a state of emergency in response to last week’s oil spill in the Black Sea, where a storm in the Kerch Strait caused two tankers to crash. Cleanup efforts have been underway since the tankers Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239 first sank on December 15. One crew member was killed, and some 3,000 metric tons of fuel leaked into the Black Sea, polluting an estimated 50 kilometers (31 miles) of coastline in Russia’s Krasnodar region. When elevating the federal government’s response, Emergency Situations Ministry head Alexander Kurenkov did not specify the exact territory where the state of emergency has been introduced. Kurenkov’s announcement comes a day after officials in Krasnodar declared a regional-level state of emergency. Municipal-level states of emergency have also been declared in parts of the Crimea and Kerch regions.…
1 Russian mayor enrages town by dressing Lenin and Catherine the Great monuments in Father Frost and Snow Maiden holiday costumes
The mayor of a town outside Yekaterinburg finds himself apologizing for a holiday makeover that dressed outdoor monuments of Vladimir Lenin and Catherine the Great as Ded Moroz (Father Frost) and Snegurochka (Snow Maiden) for New Year’s celebrations. “We were just trying to create a festive mood,” Mayor Nikolai Yudin explained on social media in response to local outrage about the costumes. Before the mayor’s apology, his office disabled online comments on its December 25 announcement revealing the holiday fun. “I still believe we insulted the memory of neither Catherine the Great nor Vladimir Ilyich Lenin! Such practices have existed in other cities (for example, in Moscow, the monument to Yuri Dolgorukiy opposite city hall was dressed up), but I apologize if our actions offended anyone. New Year’s is around the corner — let’s try to be kinder,” Mayor Yudin wrote on his VKontakte page.…
A court in Kazakhstan has sentenced blogger Azamat Sarsenbayev to 10 days in jail for photographing and filming at the Azerbaijan Airlines crash site in western Kazakhstan. (He was formally convicted of the misdemeanor offense of disobeying police orders.) Sarsenbayev, who was arrested on December 25, has pointed out that major international media outlets have used his photos from the crash site. However, police say the blogger flew a camera drone over the scene, obstructed rescue work and investigative actions, and failed to comply with orders from law enforcement. An Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed in western Kazakhstan while on its way from Baku to Grozny on December 25 after being refused landing clearance by airports in Russia. The crash claimed 38 lives, while 29 people survived, including three crew members. Videos recorded at the crash site revealed damage to the plane — particularly on the tail section — resembling impacts from the fragmentation elements of an anti-aircraft missile. Azerbaijani government sources later confirmed to Euronews that a Russian surface-to-air missile brought down the plane. Background Was Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer jet shot down? Marks on the plane’s exterior suggest it was hit by military air defenses. Meduza considers the evidence.…
1 Finland boards and seizes likely Russian ‘shadow fleet’ tanker suspected of damaging power and communications cables in Baltic Sea
The Estlink 2 undersea power cable, which runs through the Baltic Sea between Estonia and Finland, malfunctioned and went offline on Wednesday afternoon, December 25. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo says the outage will not impact public access to electricity. Finland’s national electricity transmission grid operator is investigating the incident and has not ruled out an act of vandalism. On Thursday, spokespeople for Estonia’s national transmission system operator said that diagnostics and measurements are underway to identify the damaged area of the undersea power cable. Reuters reported that Finnish authorities “boarded and took control of an oil tanker traveling from Russia,” believing its anchor may have damaged the power cable. Finnish officials say the tanker, registered in the Cook Islands, likely belongs to Russia’s “shadow fleet,” a group of ships used to evade sanctions on the sale of Russian oil. Officials did not find the ship’s anchor after boarding. The same vessel is suspected of damaging three communication cables, in addition to the Estlink 2, The Financial Times reported on Thursday. Officials investigating the damaged power line are also reportedly reviewing the potential involvement of a Hong Kong-flagged container ship that came near the Estlink 2 when it went offline. Finland and Estonia jointly own the Estlink 1 and Estlink 2 power cables. Estlink 2 has an energy transmission capacity of 658 megawatts, while Estlink 1 (which is still operating normally) has a capacity of 350 megawatts. The total length of Estlink 2 is 170 kilometers (106 miles), including 145 kilometers (90 miles) on the seabed. The Estlink 2 also malfunctioned in January 2024 and came back online only in September after lengthy repairs.…
The Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 that crashed near Aktau Airport in Kazakhstan on December 26, 2024. The Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) plane that crashed in western Kazakhstan while on its way from Baku to Grozny on Wednesday went down as a result of a Russian anti-aircraft missile, Euronews reported on Thursday, citing government sources. According to the sources, Russian air defense forces fired a surface-to-air missile at the AZAL flight amid increased drone activity in Grozny. The missile reportedly exploded near the plane, damaging its fuselage. Background Azerbaijan Airlines plane with 69 onboard crashes in Kazakhstan, over 30 survivors reported Euronews sources also said the damaged plane was denied permission to land at Russian airports, despite the pilots requesting an emergency landing. Subhonkul Rahimov, a passenger on the Baku-Grozny flight who was injured in the crash, told Russian state media that the Azerbaijan Airlines crew attempted to land in Grozny three times. The crew was instructed to fly over the Caspian Sea toward Aktau in western Kazakhstan, according to Euronews. The plane’s GPS navigation systems were reportedly jammed throughout the flight over the sea. The Azerbaijani outlet Caliber.Az reported , citing “reliable government sources,” that the plane was targeted by a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system as it approached Grozny. According to the outlet, Russian electronic warfare systems “completely paralyzed the communication systems” of the Azerbaijani aircraft, causing it to disappear from radar. The British aviation security company Osprey Flight Solutions warned its clients that the Azerbaijan Airlines flight was “likely shot down by a Russian military air-defense system,” the AP reported. Additionally, Reuters reported that the flight “was downed by a Russian air defence system,” citing four sources in Azerbaijan with knowledge of the government’s investigation. The Azerbaijani, Russian, and Kazakh governments have not officially commented on the reports that the AZAL plane was downed by Russian air defenses. On December 25, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that the flight had altered its course “due to worsening weather conditions” and that the crash occurred “during landing” in Kazakhstan. “The causes of the crash are unknown to us. There are various theories, but I believe it’s too early to discuss them. The matter must be thoroughly investigated,” Aliyev said. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia would refrain from “building any hypotheses” until the investigation is complete. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Senate Chairman Maulen Ashimbayev dismissed as "speculative" any attempts to "draw conclusions from photos, suggesting these are the result of certain actions, and so on." Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev, who is leading the government’s commission investigating the crash, told Tengrinews that authorities are currently unable to confirm or dismiss any theories due to the ongoing investigation. During a subsequent briefing in Aktau, he reiterated that it is “impossible to rule out any theory.” Bozumbayev added that Kazakhstan does not have an official version of the events, and neither Russia nor Azerbaijan has provided one. Shortly after the crash, videos emerged showing fragments of the plane’s tail section, which appeared to have damage consistent with that caused by anti-aircraft missile fragments. The crash claimed the lives of citizens from three countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan’s Health Ministry released a list of 25 victims, including passengers and crew members aged 19 to 64. According to the Azerbaijani outlet 1news , the list only included Azerbaijani citizens. Kazakhstan’s Emergency Situations Ministry reported that six Kazakhstani nationals were among the dead, while Kazakhstani Transport Minister Marat Karabayev confirmed that seven Russians were also killed. All three Kyrgyz citizens aboard survived . As of 3:45 p.m. Moscow time on December 26, the bodies of 10 victims had been identified: four Azerbaijanis, three Russians, and three Kazakhs, the Kazakhstani Emergency Situations Ministry told Russian state media. On the morning of December 26, an emergency services plane transported nine Russian survivors from Aktau to Moscow. Azerbaijani citizens who were injured in the crash were being prepared for transport to Baku later that day. The Azerbaijani authorities declared December 26 a day of mourning. A minute of silence was observed at Baku Airport, where the Azerbaijan Airlines flight had begun, and a memorial stand was set up to honor the victims. In Moscow, flowers were placed outside the Azerbaijani Embassy. The Chechen authorities pledged to assist the families of those killed and injured in the crash.…
The FSB announced that it had prevented a terrorist attack against a defense industry business leader in the Moscow region, reports Interfax. The agency did not name the company associated with the reported target, but noted that it manufactures products for Russia’s Defense Ministry. According to the FSB, seven Russian nationals — residents of the Moscow, Sverdlovsk, and Perm regions — have been detained in connection with the planned attack. Three of them are minors. The agency says that the suspects are confessing. The FSB reported that the suspects had staked out the industry leader’s parking spot, planting a homemade bomb underneath his car. Russia’s Investigative Committee said that the suspects were detained while placing the bomb. The FSB adds that the suspects were working in concert with members of Ukraine’s security service. The Investigative Committee reports that the suspects were promised 1 million rubles. The suspects have been charged with attempting a terrorist attack.…
Sergey Menyailo, head of Russia’s North Ossetia region, reported that a downed drone caused an explosion and fire in a shopping mall in Vladikavkaz. Citing information from Russia’s Defense Ministry, Menyailo said that Russia’s air defenses brought down the drone at 8:28 a.m. local time on December 25. He added that the shopping center’s surveillance cameras showed that “the explosion occurred from the outside” and that bomb disposal technicians were searching for drone fragments. Russia’s Defense Ministry has also collected information about other recent drone attacks in the North Caucasus region, Menyailo said.…
A Russian merchant ship, the Ursa Major, which sank in the Mediterranean Sea on December 23, was struck by a “targeted terrorist attack,” the vessel’s owner, the Oboronlogistka group, told RIA Novosti. The company cited reports from the ship’s crew members, who said that the vessel began to lean sharply to starboard following three successive explosions at 1:50 p.m. Moscow time on December 23, 2024. Oboronlogistika noted that the Ursa Major was not overloaded. It was en route from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok with a cargo of cranes, other equipment, and 129 empty containers. The Ursa Major has reportedly been used for years to transport supplies for Russia’s military operations in Syria.…
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